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Abstract 
 
In the UK, there has been a noticeable increase in public space management arrangements based 
on transfer and contracting-out of managerial responsibilities to organisations outside the public 
sector, whether in the shape of community or private trusts, tenants organisations, Business 
Improvement Districts, private companies or voluntary sector organisations. Recent cuts in local 
authority budgets have accelerated this process. Underpinning it there is an underlying assumption 
that publicness, however defined, can be guaranteed by means other than public ownership, funding 
and management, and that public sector ownership and direct control might not be in themselves 
essential features of spaces that are public. This paper reports on a case study research tries that 
investigates the impact on public spaces of the transfer of management away from the public sector.  
Based on nine case studies of public spaces in London under a variety of different management 
arrangements, the paper discusses how publicness is affected by the various contractual forms of 
transfer and what the main implications of this process are for different stakeholders and for the 
public realm as a whole. The paper suggests that contracted-out management of public space might 
not necessarily affect publicness negatively. However, it requires judiciously designed accountability 
mechanisms and clear decisions by all key stakeholders, including local authorities, about whose 
aspirations will be privileged and how other aspirations should be protected. In a climate of austerity 
and spending cuts, this requires a different kind of public management and of policy. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
It has become almost commonplace in writings about public space to bemoan the decline in its 
quality, the loss of its character and its gradual replacement by private or quasi-private simulacra. 
Whether or not this is factually correct, it is undeniable that the basic mechanisms for the provision 
and management of public spaces have changed. Moreover, that change seems to have followed a 
clear direction, away from direct state involvement and towards a larger role for other social agents 
in the private and community/voluntary sectors. Although most of the literature concentrates on how 
this process has taken shape in the United States, there is plenty of evidence to confirm that to 
variable degree this has been a more widespread phenomenon (see e.g. Law 2002, Minton 2006, 
2009, London Assembly 2011, Németh and Schmidt 2011, Langstraat and van Melik 2013). 
There is enough research demonstrating how alternative forms of public space provision and 
management had gained ground in the UK (De Magalhães and Carmona 2009, De Magalhães 
2010). Concern with their impact has been reflected in recent UK policy debates: the creation of 
BIDs less than 10 years ago and the debates about their role (see De Magalhães 2012); the Greater 
London Authority’s 2010 investigation into the management of publicly accessible space in London 
which concluded with the need to secure that access to public space is as unrestricted and 
unambiguous as possible; the House of Commons All Party Parliamentary Group on Land 
Maintenance 2009, which looked at the impact of the transfer to private management of green areas 
in new housing estates in Scotland; the Portas Report (Portas 2011) on the health of town centres 
and its proposal for ‘super BIDs’ taking over a large part of the responsibility for the management of 
town centres . To this should be added the on-going impact of cuts in local government budgets and 
the challenge these pose to the quality of many public services and the consequent need for their 
re-shaping. 
All those alternative public space management forms are based on transfer and contracting-out of 
managerial responsibilities to organisations outside the public sector, whether in the shape of 
Business Improvement Districts, Town Centre Management schemes, land development trusts, 
community asset transfers or the contracting-out of managerial tasks to private companies or 
voluntary sector organisations under a variety of arrangements. This process rests on the implicit 
assumption that publicness, however defined, can be guaranteed by means other than public 
ownership, funding and management, and that state ownership and direct control might not be in 
themselves essential features of spaces that are public. 
The emergence in the UK of public realm management arrangements such as those described 
above derives from a combination of factors. At their root is the gradual dominance of views of how 
to respond to relative economic decline which are based on a reduction of the role of the State and 
an increasing reliance on market mechanisms, which have been shared by governments of different 
political colours for the last 35 years. There is a vast literature on recent changes in British urban 
governance and the impacts of privatism, ‘neoliberalism’, partnerships and inter-sector collaboration, 
from different perspectives, and discussing it in detail would fall outside the scope of this paper  e.g. 
Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Leach and Percy-Smith 2010; Swyngedouw 2011; Raco 2013).  
Within broader changes in urban governance, two sets of factors, however, are especially relevant. 
The first were changes in the context in which public services provision operates. Policy efforts at 
national level to reduce the costs and size of government led to a curbing of powers and spending 
of local authorities and a redistribution of resources within public services, affecting some services 
much more than others. Public realm services have suffered a steady decline in funding from the 
early 1980s, partly halted by the end of the century (Audit Commission 2002). However, in the wake 
of the recent public sector spending cuts, funding for discretionary and non–statutory services like 
parks and open spaces is projected to fall by 60 per cent or more over the next decade (Neal 2013).  
At the same time, the flowing of power to a plethora of subsidiary bodies within and outside the 
formal boundaries of the state, has given rise to forms of collaboration between different sectors and 
jurisdictions for the delivery of public goods and services, which applies equally to public space 
services (Sullivan & Skelcher 2002). 
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The second set of factors came from new demands that were put on the public realm by policy 
makers and society. The perceived need for cities to compete to attract the more footloose 
investment of the globalised economy led to an increasing concern with the vitality and viability of 
urban areas and the role in this of public realm quality (see e.g. Urban Task Force 1999; DETR 
2000). At the same time, demographic and cultural changes have put new diversified and often 
conflicting demands on public spaces with corresponding new pressures on management systems 
(Roberts and Turner, 2005). 
The cumulative results of these contextual demands on public realm have exacerbated the 
shortcomings of traditional management systems, centred around issues of levels of funding, lack of 
coordination among agencies, the lack of flexibility and fine-tuning ability of centralised management 
systems to respond to ever fragmented demands and increasing aspirations, the constraints on 
accountability at a very localised level by city-wide public organisations, etc. (De Magalhães and 
Carmona 2006, ODPM 2004). In this light, contractualised public realm management mechanisms 
have emerged as ways of reconfiguring rights, roles and responsibilities to create management 
models that rely on the direct involvement of a variety of stakeholders to define and implement 
solutions to public realm challenges that cut across specialised remits, respond more closely to 
localised variations in demand, are flexible to changes, and access resources wherever these might 
be available.  
Whereas proponents of those alternative arrangements are to be found mostly among public space 
managers looking for immediate solutions for management challenges (see e.g. ATCM 2009), the 
academic literature has depicted these arrangements quite often in a negative light (for the 
exception, see Webster 2002, 2007). The transfer of control upon public space provision and 
management, especially from the state to the private sector, has often been linked to ideas about 
the reduction of the public sphere, death of public space, the emergence of the revanchist city, the 
intensification of processes of social exclusion and segregation, the inexorable expansion of market 
and commodity forms into the public realm, the retrenchment of the state vis-à-vis the market (see 
Low and Smith 2006, Kohn 2004, Minton 2006).  
Whether or not those critiques are an accurate depiction of reality, they certainly touch upon 
important concerns associated with the reduction of the role of the state in the provision and 
management of public space, namely the potential for exclusion and a narrower definition of 
entitlement to use those spaces, the potential erosion of accountability for their running, and the risk 
of increasing inequality in access, reinforcing other inequalities present in society. If that is indeed 
what these emerging forms of public space management mean, ‘privatisation’ of public space would 
negatively affect the public realm by subtracting from public life spaces that are open to all and in 
which all individuals and social groups can come together to express their views, meet with one 
another and thus help secure the intermingling of social groups which is a necessary condition for 
an inclusive democratic society (see Low and Smith 2006, Watson 2006). Therefore, the key issue 
then is whether emerging forms of provision and management of public space represent by definition 
an erosion of its public character, and consequently a reduction of physical dimension of the public 
sphere, or whether they have the potential to deliver most of the attributes that make up the public 
character of those spaces without negatively affecting their essence, whilst meeting the aspirations 
stakeholders may have in relation to them. This is the discussion the research summarised in this 
paper engages with. 
 
2.0 Background 
 
2.1. What is publicness and how it is secured 
The increase in number of public spaces managed by private interests, charities and user groups 
poses a number of important questions concerning what publicness is and how it can be secured; 
the effect on publicness of different governance arrangements combining a variety interests and 
aspirations; how societal aspirations in relation to public spaces can be incorporated in contracted-
out governance strategies; and the broader implications of those arrangements for urban life and 
urban governance in general. Key to this discussion is an understanding of what it is that public 
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spaces provide that needs securing through whichever provision system is in place, as well as what 
would characterise those benefits as ‘public’. 
As the literature on public space testifies, public space as a concept can encompass a wide variety 
of notions. The concept can be extended to all communal and non-private arenas of social life, which 
do not necessarily imply physical space and include the media and the virtual spaces of the internet 
(see e.g. Ellin 1996, Taylor 1995, Watson 2006). It can be narrowed down to define all those physical 
spaces that are not strictly private, including not only publicly owned spaces but also all those spaces 
in which social and civic functions with a public character are performed, regardless of ownership 
(Ellin 1996). This includes the semi-public, liminal or ‘third’ spaces of cafes, bars, bookstores, etc. 
(Banerjee 2001, Oldenburg 1999). It can also be narrowed down even further, as in the remit for 
local government public-space services, to refer specifically to state-owned parks, civic spaces and 
most ordinary streets and squares.  
Moreover, most of those definitions rely on an opposition between ‘private’ and ‘public’, which might 
refer strictly to ownership, or to the nature of the activities that take place in public space – whether 
they are part of the private or public life of individuals. Again, the potential for variation of what is 
public and what is private is considerable. In his study of public and private spaces, Madanipour 
(2003) demonstrates the complexity of the transition from public to private, with several overlapping 
levels of publicness and privateness between them. Moreover, as societies change, activities that 
once took place in the public realm might acquire a more private character and vice-versa, thus 
changing the public/private character of spaces over time. The very notion of public space as a 
distinct concept is itself a historical product, which came into being with the differentiation between 
the representative state, civil society and the market, and the consolidation of modern notions of 
private property (Habermas 2001) 
This historical evolution is clearly illustrated in Arendt’s discussion of the genesis of the concept of 
‘common good’ (Arendt 1998). She sustains that the boundaries between the private and public 
realms were clear until the late middle age: the former was the domain of individual/family matters 
whereas the latter was the arena of political matters. However, the emergence of the concept of 
‘society’ in the Modern Era put an end to the clear division between both realms. On the one hand, 
the idea of ‘society’ asserted the relevance of those matters that were once within the exclusive remit 
of the private realm (the individual/family) – e.g. health, education, economy. On the other hand, the 
operationalisation of the concept necessarily entailed the assumption that all its members had one 
common interest or one common opinion. For Arendt, it was precisely because of this apparent one 
common interest that ‘society’ became understood as the ‘public realm’, which is in reality a ‘hybrid 
realm’ that conflates public and private matters (Arendt 1998:59). This historical process underpins 
the emergence of the modern concept of ‘common good’, which in turn has shaped the way we have 
come to understand public spaces. In the medieval times, the ‘common good’ was the materialisation 
of different individual interests over one common thing, which necessarily led to a negotiation 
between the interested parties over the maintenance and enjoyment of that ‘common good’ (Arendt 
1998:59). Accordingly, far from representing an assertion of the public realm, the ‘common good’ 
was an assertion of the private realm. This situation changed radically with the advent of the ideal 
‘society’, when ‘common goods’ and ‘common interests’ were assimilated as part of the ‘public 
realm’. As a consequence, the inherent private nature of ‘common goods’ was first overlooked and 
finally negated. Drawing on Arendt’s work, it could be argued then that a discussion of public spaces 
should at least recognize the inherent tensions embedded in the concept. In so far as they are a 
‘common good’, the framing of public spaces should acknowledge the legitimate conflicts between 
its private nature – the concrete individual interests over a concrete site – and its public nature – the 
societal concerns about the management of its resources. 
Given the dual nature of the concept, this paper suggests that it is more relevant and accurate to 
look at those essential qualities of public spaces that give them their specificity, in order to assess 
the impact that different forms of management might have on the publicness of those spaces. This 
way, the dual nature of public space is not ignored in the discussion of its attributes, which would not 
be the case if the analysis had started from an absolute definition of what public space is, might be 
in contraposition to other types of space, or should ideally be. 
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Different authors have offered different lists of the attributes that shape publicness and therefore 
provide public spaces their specificity. Kohn (2004: 11) for instance, defines public spaces as places 
owned by the government, accessible to everyone without restrictions and fostering communication 
and interaction. The emphasis here is on the attributes of (public) ownership, accessibility and 
intersubjectivity. However, communication and interaction rarely happen as often as these authors 
suggest. The literature from the psychology field shows the existing different levels of interpersonal 
relations and how the depth and likelihood of these depend more on trust than on the qualities of the 
space where these happen. Low and Smith (2006: 3) emphasise the role of rules of access, the 
source and nature of control over entry, the nature of sanctioned collective and individual behaviour 
and the rules of use as the key differentiator between public and private space. Mitchell and Staeheli 
(2006) see this essence residing in rights of access, of being there, for all citizens. For some, 
publicness is related to the creation of spaces for encounters with difference, which are essential to 
a democratic polity. Watson (2006) emphasises public space as a space of protest and for the 
expression of minority interests. Worpole and Knox (2007:4) base their view on the value of public 
space on the opportunity those spaces create for shared use and activity, meeting and exchange, 
regardless of ownership. Others have sought publicness in the attributes of accessibility (to place, 
activities, information and resources), ownership and control and the nature of both the benefits it 
provides and who benefits from them (Benn and Gaus 1983, Akkar 2005). Madanipour: (2003: 112-
13) defines public space in opposition to other kinds of space, mediating between private spaces 
and used for a variety of often overlapping functional and symbolic purposes. The key attributes here 
are access, agency and interest. Németh and Schmidt (2011) try to operationalise a definition of 
publicness based on ownership (public/private), management (inclusive & open/exclusive & closed), 
and the diversity of users and uses. Similarly, Varna (2014) emphasises ownership, modes of 
control, physical configuration, and degrees of animation and civility, with an ideal type of public 
space against which all others should be measured. 
This varied set of elements defining publicness resonates with broader definitions of what is ‘public’ 
in public goods and services in general. These involve the extent of their distinction from private 
ones, the scope and composition of their recipients, the magnitude and intensity of their socio-
economic roles, the degree of public accountability to which they are subjected, and the level of 
public trust in them (see Haque 2001).  
Many of these formulations of publicness have a strong normative character and point towards an 
absolute ideal of public space, which would foster communication, civility or identity. Most people 
would agree that good public spaces should perhaps do all that, but actual public spaces, accepted 
by everyone as such, do not, or do not always do it. Amin (2008) suggests that some of the ‘fostering 
civility and identity’ attributes of public space are increasingly played out in non-spatial parts of the 
public sphere such as the Internet, and furthermore, for those attributes to be realised in any 
particular space a set of other conditions need to be present that go beyond the mere existence of 
that space. Moreover, many of the attributes of public space described above will only be present in 
degrees. Webster (2002) argues that very few urban public goods – public spaces included - are 
really public in the sense of absolute openness to consumption by everyone. A person’s ability to 
benefit from many important attributes of a public space such as openness of access and use will 
depend on several factors, and in many respects those attributes will be consumed as club goods 
by those not excluded from them by e.g. access costs, property prices. This reinforces the idea that 
rather than an absolute concept, publicness should be seen as a conveyor of a relative set of 
qualities: for any public space, there will be attributes that are more public or less public, depending 
on the criteria used to define the limits between publicness and privateness, but also on the manner 
with which those attributes are consumed. 
The idea of publicness as a relative concept, shaped by the particular negotiations that take place 
in each context does not represent an inherent anti-democratic process, as some may argue. If we 
agree with Arendt that plurality is the main condition for a political life (Arendt 1998), it could be 
argued that any attempt of reducing this plurality to a homogeneous abstraction – i.e. the people or 
the society – undermines the political dimension that is part and parcel of the notion of publicness. 
In this sense, the idea of public space as a space for everyone as an undifferentiated collective would 
actually be less democratic than the idea of a space in which individual stakes are recognised and 
negotiated among concrete individuals. Following this logic, it could be argued that publicness has 
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to do more with the way in which this negotiation process happens than with a pre-determined 
definition. 
In a similar way, this differential appropriation of the space and its attributes would bring us closer to 
a truly “differential space” (Lefebvre 1991), in which the particularities of the context are recognised 
and placed at the forefront of the negotiations defining the use of the space and its publicness. Public 
Space as a normative ideal would represents an absolute concept, a totality. That totality would 
overrule the ‘lived space’ in which users negotiate and define the rules for the appropriation of the 
attributes of each individual space, in favour of a ‘conceived space’ in which those rules are externally 
fixed and contextless. In this regard, the idea of a public space in which all attributes are always 
accessible to all overlooks the particularities of each space – the particular set of social relations and 
physical attributes that produce that space. Consequently, the idealised, normative form of public 
space would be one that masks or supresses the negotiation of rules of appropriation between 
stakeholders and therefore anti-democratic. 
Therefore, and using the insights of the discussion above, if we discount the more normative 
elements contained in many notions of publicness – which focus on what it should aspire to be, not 
what it might be - and take into account its relative character, we are left with the basic attributes of 
rights of access, rights of use and control/ownership. We would expect of a public space that it should 
be provided and managed in a way that secures a relative openness of access to most members of 
society. We would also expect that people would be able to use that space without other restrictions 
than those dictated by broadly accepted social norms of behaviour, the context of the space and 
rights of other users. Finally, we would expect users to have some say over key decisions regarding 
the management and the future of the space, even if indirectly.  
Rights of access encompass rules and mechanisms that regulate whatever restrictions there might 
be on how individuals access the attributes they value in a particular public space, be they physical 
access to the site, the use of a facility or the confirmation of a symbolic function. Rights of use refer 
to the rules and codes of behaviour, and enforcement mechanisms that regulate how individuals that 
have access to a public space can enjoy its attributes. Finally, rights of control and ownership do not 
necessarily refer to public ownership, but to the rules and mechanisms through which a variety of 
stakes in a particular public space are recognised in its governance, and through which conflicts and 
disputes between different stakes can be solved. Madanipour (2003) defines publicness as a 
function of being outside individual or small group control, and of being used collectively for a variety 
of overlapping functional and symbolic purposes. This implies a more diffuse control over a space, 
on which many people have a recognised stake and should have some form of say about what 
happens to it and how it is governed and managed. State ownership in this context is shorthand for 
a form of diffuse control in democratic societies, as well as a guarantee of open access and use.  
Therefore, rather than a public space in the singular, following or aspiring to an ideal, cities have 
public spaces in the plural, with various forms of publicness depending on the nature and degree of 
the publicness attributes available and the ways those attributes can be appropriated.  
The relationship between the mechanisms for provision of public spaces and the attributes that 
define those spaces might be rather complex, with an array of contextual variables contributing to 
shape it. Understanding those mechanisms, how they work and how the relate to their governance 
context is a key part in investigating the impact of emerging forms of public space governance. 
Therefore, whether or not forms of governance that deviate from the publicly-owned and managed 
model would reduce publicness, would depend on how these forms deal with publicness attributes 
and how they set the rules for their appropriation by the different stakeholders.  
 
2.2. Understanding contracted-out publicness: the issues 
The provision of public services and goods in the UK and elsewhere has become increasingly more 
reliant on contracts between a public sector client and a contractor capable of offering some form of 
advantage in the provision of those goods/services such as reduced costs, technical expertise, 
flexibility, sensitivity to localised demands, and so on. Accordingly, contractual relationships play an 
important part in emerging forms of public space provision. Contracts between business occupiers, 
and local government regulate the operation of BIDs; leasehold agreements with contractual 
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stipulations regulate the transfer of public space ownership to development trusts as well as the 
functioning of those trusts; contracts and local service agreements regulate the contracting out of 
public space management and maintenance.   Whereas most of the above are translated into 
formalised agreements, there are also less formal contract-type relationships such as those between 
local government and public space friends and users’ associations, which secure the role of the latter 
as consultees in public space management, as well as various kinds of semi-formal partnerships. 
From a public space governance perspective, the key research question is, therefore, whether 
contracts, contractual mechanisms and sanctions are adequate means of securing the attributes of 
publicness that are valued in the spaces to which they apply. Can contracts guarantee relatively 
open access and ensure that restrictions to access and use are broadly acceptable by most potential 
users and stakeholders? Are contractual sanctions adequate to discourage what Madanipour (2003) 
refers to as ‘small control group’? Are contractual mechanisms capable of securing a say by all 
relevant stakeholders in how a public space is managed?  
For an answer to these questions, we suggest that three interrelated sets of issues need to be 
considered. The first refers to the way contracts recognise rights and obligations and therefore, 
power in public space governance. The second addresses the contextual factors influencing which 
rights and obligations are relevant for any public space. The last deals with the substance of 
contracts in terms of which public space governance responsibilities they refer to, and how these 
are distributed between parties. 
It has been argued that emergent public space governance practices involve a reallocation of rights 
over some of the attributes that constitute publicness, and specifically an allocation of rights that 
move away from the public domain towards private parties (Peel, Lloyd and Lord 2009). Contractual 
instruments shape this reallocation of rights by recognising interests. As an example, groups of 
citizens and organisations operating in a development trust managing a publicly owned park, will 
have secured the right to prioritise the attributes they value in that space (i.e. aesthetic, amenity, 
etc.) in relation to those valued by other people even if, as it is often the case, this is moderated by 
the client power of a local government department. They will have a right to have a say on how the 
park is used, on how restrictions to access and use are applied and on how money is spent in 
maintenance and upgrade by virtue of living or having their place of work in the vicinity of that park, 
or of some other recognised stake. In this sense, the contracting out of public space provision 
recognises the ‘club-good’ dimension of many public-space attributes, in the terms used by Webster 
(2002) of goods and attributes that can be consumed non-rivalrously by members of a group, but 
with exclusion rules applying to non-members.  
The often implicit justification for recognising club-like interests in public space is that it allows for 
the relative strengths of claims over its attributes to be taken into account and transformed into a 
more effective and efficient management resource. The assumption is that, because the members 
of such a club have the strongest stake on a particular set of public space attributes, they will manage 
these more efficiently and to best effect, and this applies to businesses protecting the quality of a 
commercial district as well as to residents securing the amenity value a local park. However, by the 
very nature of public space there will be many divergent and often conflictive claims on it, and 
therefore a choice needs to be made on which of those will have the upper hand, which will be 
formally recognised, which will not. Whereas efficient resource allocation in its broadest sense might 
provide one set of criteria for assessing those claims and allocating rights, it is certainly not the only 
one possible or desirable. Whichever criteria prevail, it will determine whose claims are allocated the 
rights over particular attributes of public space, and this initial distribution of rights will largely 
determine the outcomes of any future negotiations over those attributes, such as the ability of other 
stakeholders’ interests/claims to gain access to them.  
Moreover, some claims that could be regarded as legitimate by society might not be immediately 
visible, they might be too diffuse or they might manifest themselves only occasionally and therefore 
are unlikely to make their way into formal contractual arrangements. Research demonstrates that 
particular social groups are less likely to use public parks and therefore less likely to get involved in 
their management (DTLR 2002). These groups will not be in a position to advance their interests in 
how a park is managed, even if it is socially desirable that they did so. Therefore, looking at the 
transformation of a wide range of stakes on a public space (including those less visible and obvious 
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ones) into rights over that space and efficient management tools, could shed some light on the 
potential impact that contractualised provision could have on the publicness of that space.  
The second set of issues that needs to be considered is the role of context specific variables in 
determining publicness. Public spaces have particular locational, functional and morphological 
properties, which condition the kinds of publicness attributes these spaces might offer. Publicness 
attributes in a park or square in a prominent city centre location, an important commercial street or 
a small suburban residential street are bound to vary as these spaces will be used and valued 
differently by their users. In each of those public spaces, there will be a different range of stakes, 
interests and demands, with their own relative power and influence. As a result, the process of 
negotiation between different stakes around the key elements of publicness is likely to lead to 
different outcomes, depending on the nature of the space and the interests it creates. We should 
therefore expect that a Business Improvement District in a central retail area will address the key 
concerns of openness, accessibility and control/ownership differently from a voluntary user group 
made up of residents taking control of a small local park. Similarly, the manner in which these 
concerns will be translated into agreements between the main stakeholders will also vary. This 
suggests the potential for a landscape characterised by several forms of publicness, the outcome 
being a variety of agreements between different sets of stakeholders, with key publicness attributes 
assuming different forms in different places.  It could be argued then that locally-specific public space 
governance arrangements lead to an unequal and differentiated sharing of publicness attributes. 
Whether this would ultimately mean a consistent reduction in the enjoyment of those attributes, in 
some types of places and for some people should be one of the key questions around this second 
set of issues. 
Finally, the third set of issues relates to the substance of public space governance contracts. 
Contracts set roles for the involved parties as client and provider or principal and agent (Vincent-
Jones 2000). In a typical contract, the client – usually a local government body – has the 
responsibility to specify and deliver the services associated with public space governance. The 
contract transfers in whole or in part, some or all of those responsibilities to a provider/agent who 
will reside outside the public sector. The services involved might be restricted to public space 
maintenance tasks, as is increasingly the case with the maintenance of parks and green areas in 
the UK, or might encompass a wide range of governance responsibilities including funding, and rule 
enforcing. In this sense, it could be argued that contracts are a formalisation of the social relations 
that are happening in space. These relations shape the way the contract is set up and in turn, the 
contract will reproduce that set of relations over time. Accordingly, the drafting of the contract 
becomes a key point in the discussion. 
Public space governance can be defined as the sphere in which societal demands on and aspirations 
for public space are articulated and realised, and that this takes place through the intersection of 
four sets of processes (Carmona, De Magalhães and Hammond 2008, De Magalhães and Carmona 
2009): 
 The regulation of uses and conflicts between uses: the processes through which rules for using 
and accessing public spaces are set, the framework for solving conflicts between uses is defined, 
codes of behaviour are agreed and rule enforcement powers are distributed; 
 The definition and deployment of maintenance routines: the setting and deploying of procedures 
and routines that ensure that public spaces are usable, uncluttered, clean and safe, that the 
surfaces of roads, street furniture, lighting, vegetation and facilities of all sorts are kept to desired 
standards; 
 Investment and resourcing: the process of securing financial and material resources and utilising 
them in day-to-day management tasks and in capital funding as and when significant re-design 
and re-development is required; 
 The coordination of interventions in public space: the practices through which the actions of the 
wide array of people and organisations involved in the previous three processes are brought 
together and coordinated, made all the more pressing by the fragmentation of the ‘command and 
control’ state and the emergence of ‘enabling’ forms of urban governance (Leach and Percy-
Smith 2001). 
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All four processes are directly relevant to the key publicness attributes of openness of access and 
use and a degree of collective control. Consequently, which parts of those processes are transferred 
in emerging public space governance arrangements, the extent of the transfer and the manner in 
which it is done will all potentially shape the resulting nature and level of publicness for any given 
space. Therefore, in order to understand the impacts on publicness of contract-based government 
arrangements we need also explore the nature of these agreements and which governance 
processes they refer to, and whether or not the way they deal with those processes has positive or 
negative impacts on publicness attributes. 
The conceptual framework discussed above is summarised in figure 1 below: 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
3.0 Methodology 
 
The conceptual points above suggest, therefore, an operable definition of publicness conceived as 
a function of: 
 Openness and accessibility: This refers to the extension of the rights of access and use, as well 
as the nature, degree and form of exclusions and limitations. As they can overlap to a significant 
extent, rights of access and rights of use were considered together for the purposes of the 
research.  
 Accountability: This refers to the openness and responsiveness of management decision-making 
systems to users and other stakeholders, and to the sensitivity of those systems to users’ and 
societal aspirations expressed in policy objectives. 
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Accordingly, the research reported in this paper examined how the ‘publicness’ of open, publicly-
owned spaces – defined as a function of openness/accessibility and accountability, is affected by 
the various contractual forms of transfer of public space management tasks from the public sector 
to private and user-based organisations, and what are the main implications of this process. 
In order to do so, the following questions were addressed:  
 Q1. How are the key attributes of publicness (i.e. openness, access and accountability issues) 
dealt with in public realm management contracts and how are roles and responsibilities 
allocated? 
 Q2. How are those attributes dealt in the day-to-day implementation of those contracts?  
 Q3. Do these arrangements and their implementation affect those attributes and how do they do 
it? 
 Q4. What are the implications of ‘contracted-out publicness’ for key stakeholders’ objectives and 
aspirations? 
The nature of the research questions suggest the use of case studies, combining examples of 
different types of management transfer mechanisms, different types of organisation to which 
management responsibilities have been transferred, and a diversity of locational contexts with their 
own pressures on public space management. 
The research relied on documentary evidence (legislation, contracts and agreements) and interviews 
with the key players in the management of the selected cases, namely the relevant departments of 
the local authority, the main management organisation for the case, and a user/stakeholder 
organisation where possible.  
A total of 22 interviews were conducted between mid-May and early September 2014, lasting from 
45 min to 1 hour and occasionally longer. Those interviews explored how management contracts 
and agreements dealt with openness and accessibility as well as how contracts/agreements had 
been implemented. They focused on ease of physical access; right of access and use; the nature, 
degree and form of exclusions and limitations; degree and openness of access to decisions about 
investment, layout, opening times, access rules and codes of behaviour; and sensitivity and 
responsiveness of management systems to user aspirations and local and national policy objectives 
(Appendix 1). The information obtained in the interviews provided direct answers to research 
questions Q1 and Q2. 
Analysis and interpretation of the interview material provided the answers to Q3. Information from 
each of the cases regarding the distribution of power and responsibilities in all dimensions of 
management over issues of openness/accessibility and accountability provided a classification of 
the cases and generated a typology of publicness. This typology relates to the nature of management 
arrangements, to variations in the attributes of publicness and to the roles of the various 
stakeholders. This typology was used to explore how and to what extent the aspirations of key 
stakeholders are being met and thus provides an answer to Q4. 
 
3.1 Selection of case studies: 
Preliminary research was undertaken to identify potential case studies. This initial exercise yielded 
a set of about 55 potential case studies in England, from which 9 cases were selected. All the cases 
are located in South London. Although there were potential cases elsewhere in England, there was 
enough variety of potential cases in the three adjoining boroughs of Lambeth, Southwark and 
Lewisham to allow for diversity while simultaneously keeping the policy context relatively fixed to 
simplify the cross-case analysis. The cases, their basic characteristics and the nature of the 
interviewees is summarised in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Case studies 
Cases Type Location (local 
authority) 
Interviewees 
Myatts Field 
North Estate 
Private management of grounds of 
housing estate via PFI  25-year 
concession 
 
London Borough of 
Lambeth 
Regenter (PFI 
management) 
 
Local Authority 
Leathermarket 
Area Estates 
Tenant/leaseholder-led management 
of public spaces in social housing 
estates via a TMO (tenants’ 
management organisation) 
London Borough of 
Southwark 
Leathermarket JMB 
(TMO) 
 
Residents liaison 
 
Local Authority 
Potters Fields 
Local authority park leased to private 
charitable trust  
London Borough of 
Southwark 
Potters Field Trust 
management 
 
GLA 
 
Local Authority 
Waterloo 
Millennium 
Green 
Local authority park leased to 
community organisation 
London Borough of 
Lambeth 
BOST (community trust) 
 
Waterloo Quarter (BID) 
Bernie Spain 
Gardens 
Park in public land leased to a  
housing development cooperative 
London Borough of 
Lambeth 
Coin Street Community 
Builders (development 
trust) 
 
Grounds manager 
 
Spine Route  
Street intervention and management 
coordinated by non-profit company 
South Bank Employers’ Group 
(SBEG) 
London Borough of 
Lambeth and London 
Borough of Southwark 
Lambeth Council 
 
Southwark Council 
 
SBEG 
 
Lower Marsh 
Market 
Street market management 
contracted out to Business 
Improvement District 
 
London Borough of 
Lambeth 
Waterloo Quarter BID 
 
Local Authority 
Jubilee Gardens 
Park in public land in a secondary 
leased to a private charitable trust and 
redeveloped with S106 monies 
London Borough of 
Lambeth 
SBEG 
 
South Bank BID 
 
Coin Street Community 
Builders 
Lewisham Parks 
 
Contracted-out full management of all 
parks within Local Authority area to 
private contractor 
London Borough of 
Lewisham 
 
Glendale Lewisham 
(contractors) 
 
Local Authority 
 
Blackheath Society 
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Figure 2. Location of the case studies: area A (river bank in Lambeth and Southwark boroughs, cases from 1 to 
7); area B (Myatts Fields North, in Lambeth borough); and area C (the whole of Lewisham borough)  
 
4.0 Case Study Analysis: 
The research looked at the nine cases of alternative forms of public space management described 
above. Secondary data from websites, contracts and other documents and primary data from 
interviews were used to build a detailed profile of each case. Those profiles include a brief description 
of the space and its context. This is followed by a description of the management body and of the 
management contract, the latter examining what the contract covers and how it is implemented. 
Those descriptive sections feed into a discussion of the nature of public space management in each 
case, looking at the four main dimensions of public space management described earlier 
(coordination, regulation, maintenance, investment). That discussion in turn underpins an 
examination of the openness and accessibility issues (rights of access and use, nature, degree and 
form of exclusions and limitations). This is followed by an examination accountability mechanisms 
(openness and responsiveness of decision making to users and sensitivity to users’ aspirations). For 
more details on the cases and the operation of the research, see RICS (2015). 
 
 
4 
Case studies in area A: 
 
1. Jubilee Gardens 
2. Spine Route 
3. Bernie Spain Gardens 
4. Potters Fields Park 
5. Leathermarket JMB Estates 
6. Waterloo Millennium Green 
7. Lower Marsh Market 
A 
B C 
Tower of 
London 
Houses of 
Parliament 
River Thames 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
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4.1. The context for public space management 
Location in relation to town and city centres, residential areas, iconic places, transport hubs, etc., 
determine the range of interests and pressures in a particular public space. Similarly, the immediate 
surroundings of a public space determine how those interests and pressures relate to the attributes 
of that space. Table 2 summarizes the main attributes that characterize the different contexts for 
each case. 
Two of the cases are small public spaces within predominantly residential neighbourhoods, whose 
main relevance is to those living in their immediate surroundings. Local residents are therefore those 
with the stronger stake in those spaces, and those whose interests are likely to be privileged in any 
management arrangement. The open spaces within the Leathermarket area estates and those within 
the Myatts Field North estate are in this category, although the former is located in the proximity of 
a major railway terminus, a large hospital and large office buildings, within an area which is fast 
changing its character. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those parks in prominent locations, surrounded by a variety 
of uses, performing a variety of local and supra local functions and attracting different types of users 
who seek different attributes of those parks. Potters Fields, Jubilee Gardens and the northern part 
of Bernie Spain Gardens are in this category. Surrounding businesses, residents, occasional visitors, 
office workers, passing tourists, commercial landlords, all have an interest in how those spaces are 
used and managed, and those interests are not necessarily concurrent. Due to their prominent 
location, the role of these spaces as local parks for surrounding residents is in continuous tension 
with their position as waiting room for major touristic sites (the Tower of London and Tower Bridge, 
the London Eye, the South Bank complex and the Thames riverside walk). Management 
arrangements in this type of public spaces have to grapple with accommodating a diversity of 
interests, some direct and well articulate and some far more diffuse; establish hierarchies of 
importance between them; and create mechanisms to solve unavoidable conflicts. 
Three of the remaining cases are in a category that lies between those spaces that provide both an 
essentially local service and a wider one. Waterloo Millennium Green, the Spine Route and Lower 
Marsh Market are all in centrally located mixed use neighbourhoods, with significant resident 
populations in the immediate surroundings, but also with significant commercial use around them 
that draw a large influx of visitors. The three spaces retain a strong significance for local residents, 
businesses and landlords who, as we will see later, are important clients and participants of the 
management mechanisms. However, these three spaces have also clear functions at a wider level 
(local park close to major railway terminus, bicycle corridor and street market) and therefore local 
interests have to be reconciled with those of other users in different ways. 
The last case, Lewisham Parks, represents the only management arrangement which is not location 
specific and encompasses the full diversity of public open spaces within the London Borough of 
Lewisham, be they recreational or functional. As such, it has been designed to include and respond 
to the multiplicity of situations and interests that might be present in different types of open spaces 
within a local authority area, from the grounds of local authority housing estates, to small 
neighbourhood squares and parks, to a large park with London-wide significance such as 
Blackheath. 
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Table 2: The context of each case 
Cases Summary 
Myatts Field North Estate 
Park, squares and gardens within and around a redeveloped council 
housing estate in South London 
Leathermarket Area Estates 
Gardens and open spaces within a council housing estate close to Central 
London 
Potters Fields 
Medium size park and gardens in highly visible and prominent position by 
the river Thames and opposite to the Tower of London 
Waterloo Millennium Green Small park located in a traffic junction and near Waterloo Railway Station  
Bernie Spain Gardens 
Medium size park and gardens located within a cooperative housing area in 
a highly prominent location by the river Thames in Central London 
Spine Route  
Road space located behind the Southbank riverfront buildings from 
Westminster Bridge to Blackfriars Bridge 
Lower Marsh Market 
Small street market located south of Waterloo Railway Station, within a BID 
area and in the border between commercial spaces facing the Thames and 
housing estates to the south 
Jubilee Gardens 
Medium sized garden located in highly visible and prominent position by the 
Thames, next to the London Eye and the Southbank cultural centre 
Lewisham Parks 
All council-owned parks and open spaces within the London Borough of 
Lewisham 
 
 
4.2. The contractual agreements  
 
4.2.1. The nature and scope of the agreements 
The selection of the cases was meant to include different types of contractual agreements. This 
allowed the research to observe the relationship between the types of contract, the nature of the 
interests they privilege and the way the deal with publicness attributes. The nature of the various 
contractual agreements and management organisations is summarised in Table 3 below.  
The type of contract varies from long leases, which give the lessee substantial ownership rights over 
the public spaces including the right to manage and often the right to derive income from the space, 
to more focused service contracts for the delivery of specified management services for shorter 
periods, to a loose informal arrangement as in the Spine Route, contested and in the process of 
being redefined.  
The scope of those agreements varies less: both the long leases and the service contracts tend to 
cover a wide range of management responsibilities. However, in three of the cases (Myatts Field 
North Estate, Leathermarket Area Estates and Lower Marsh Market) public space management is 
incidental to the main focus of the contract (the management of local authority housing estates in 
the former two, the management of the street market in the latter). Provisions for public space 
management in those cases are just part of a wider set of provisions, performance indicators and 
contractual targets.  
Long leases are present in four of the cases. Potters Fields was leased by Southwark Council for 30 
years to the Potters Field Management Trust in 2005, with a right to renew the lease. The trust was 
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responsible for overseeing the initial redevelopment of the park and has full autonomy for the 
management of all aspects, including minor works and maintenance. It is also allowed by the lease 
to raise income through hiring the park or parts of it for private events with restricted access. The 
lease has an accompanying Service Level Agreement, which includes detailed specifications on 
cleaning, health and safety, maintenance, gardening and hiring the park for events. 
Waterloo Millennium Green was leased by Lambeth Council to Bankside Open Spaces Trust (BOST) 
in 2014, with an exceptionally long lease (999 years).This replaces a similar lease signed with 
Waterloo Green Trust in 2001 (WGT partnered with BOST in 2009 and was absorbed into the latter 
with the new lease). The contract requires BOST, the tenant, to keep the park in good condition. 
BOST is responsible for routine maintenance - from cleaning and waste collection to gardening and 
small improvements, as well as the management of the park on behalf of Lambeth Council, including 
securing revenue funding and empowering the community to take on greater responsibility for the 
park. Recognition of area as a ‘local park’ in contract makes it subject to the Council’s Open Space 
Strategy and entitles BOST to some financial support from the Council towards management and 
enhancement. The Service Level Agreement that accompanies the lease contract sets out the works 
and maintenance programmes against which BOST’s performance is measured and sets out the 
amount of annual funding BOST should receive. 
The other two cases with leases involve properties that had belonged to the abolished Greater 
London Council (GLC), the former government for London disbanded in 1986. Jubilee Gardens was 
leased to the Jubilee Gardens Trust for 135 years by leaseholders Southbank Centre in 2012, in a 
sub-lease of the same duration of the lease they have from the freeholders the Arts Council England 
(which inherited the site from the GLC).There are however complex covenants and restrictions 
related to an underground lease on 1/3 of the site to nearby County Hall. As specified in the lease, 
the trust has to provide a park and facilities for the benefit of the public, promote the conservation, 
protection and improvement of the physical and natural environment, educate the public in the 
subject of the history of the area, and promote community participation in healthy recreation. This 
includes full responsibility for managing and maintaining the park, including enforcing rules and 
regulations about the use of the park and its facilities, but significantly not the power to raise income 
through hiring the park for events. 
Bernie Spain Gardens was leased for 99 years, renewable for a further 99 years by the Coin Street 
Community Builders from the London Residuary Body, the entity set up to dispose of the GLC assets. 
The lease includes both the gardens and the adjacent Thames riverside walkway. The lease makes 
CSCB responsible for all the planting, repairing, renewing, and all day-to-day management tasks, 
and allow the leaseholders to promote events and festivals to raise income to re-invest in the park. 
Four other cases involved straightforward albeit complex management contracts, put out to tender, 
with no transfer of ownership rights. In two of those cases public space management is one minor 
item in much broader housing estate management contracts. In Myatts Field North Estate, public 
space management is included in a 25-year Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract between 
Lambeth Council and Regenter PFI Consortium, a complex build and operate contract signed in 
2012 after 6 years of negotiations. Through that contract the consortium is responsible for the 
demolition of exiting housing blocks, the construction and refurbishment of almost 1,000 housing 
units, a community centre, commercial units and a large park, housing and tenant management 
services once the development is completed and management and maintenance of the council 
housing stock and open spaces for 25 years. As is the case with PFI operations, the consortium 
makes the capital investment upfront (in housing and the open spaces) and recover its investment 
through sale of private housing, council transfers for housing and estate management services and 
capital investment repayment. The park and grounds management element has yet to be fully 
developed, but should be based on  a full set of standards and performance indicators specifying 
the nature of the management and maintenance service the consortium will have to provide. 
In the Leathermarket Area Estates, public space management is part of a transfer of managerial 
responsibility for Southwark Council-owned housing and grounds in the terms of the Right to Manage 
legislation, to Leathermarket Joint Management Board (JMB), a tenant and resident-led body. The 
transfer took place after a successful ballot by residents in 1996, reconfirmed every five years as 
required by law. According to the contract, JMB manages housing allocation and tenants for the 
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housing estates under their jurisdiction, and also, maintenance, minor and major works on the 
estates, including redevelopment. Public space management is a minor part of the agreement and 
it encompasses laying out and maintaining the grounds of the estates. Differently from typical Right 
to Manage contracts in which the tenant management body is paid a fee for their services, JMB is 
allowed to keep all the rent and service charges from leaseholders raised on their estates in return 
for a 30 year investment plan and the obligation to pay off the housing debt attributable to their 
property previously paid by Southwark Council. The contract is supervised directly by the local 
authority, the freeholders of the estates, with powers to intervene and revoke the agreement and 
take back management. 
 
Figure 3. Resident-led space management inside one of the Leathermarket Area estates. 
In the case of Lower Marsh Market, the contract centres on the management of the street market 
and transfer management responsibilities from Lambeth Council to Waterloo Quarter BID (WQB) 
and its subsidiary Lower Marsh Market Ltd (LMM), created specifically to manage the market. The 
contract was signed in 2012 and replaces a similar one signed in 2011 with Westminster Artisans, a 
social enterprise. The contract licenses WQB, through LMM to manage approximately 25 traders 
that make up the market and control all the vacant pitches, and transfers to LMM the management 
on behalf of the Council of another 5 traders operating under a different legal regime. LMM pays an 
annual license fee to operate the market and buy services from the local authority (waste collection 
and street cleaning), and in return they can manage the commodity mix, trading times, the physical 
appearance of the market, cleanliness of the street (service bought from the local authority). Income 
for LMM is raised through the fees charged to market traders and any surplus generated has to be 
reinvested in street improvements. LMM performance is monitored by a Service Level Agreement, 
with targets for the operation of the market. It includes a cap on the number of hot food stalls; targets 
for commodity mixing; market appearance, cleanliness; and complaints procedures by traders and 
members of the public. Strategic oversight of the market operation is done by a steering group 
chaired by Lambeth Council and made up of representatives of local businesses, market traders and 
local residents with quarterly meetings. 
Lewisham Parks has an overarching public space management contract, conceived as a PFI-style 
10-year agreement awarded to Glendale in 2000. It was renewed for another 10 years in 2010. The 
original contract was divided into two main parts: grounds maintenance for over 300 housing estates 
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and management for 48 parks and open spaces, including 200 enclosures (mostly highway 
enclosures). In 2010, the two elements were combined to form the Greenspace Maintenance and 
Management Contract, encompassing every part of the service: grounds maintenance and 
cleansing, security, liaison with parks user groups, events management, together with sports 
development. The contract also transferred liability for insurance claims to Glendale. The original 
agreement also included £1.5million up-front investment to upgrade parks and infrastructure over its 
first 3 years, payable back by the council over the duration of the contract. The renewed one does 
not have the investment element, but includes a 3% yearly efficiency saving component, derived 
from the need to face cuts in council budgets. To help achieve those savings, Glendale is allowed to 
generate income through events, and acting as a manager for grants obtained by the council or park 
friends’ groups. Monitoring of the contract is done by Lewisham Council as the client. As part of the 
re-tender of the contract in in 2010, the council required method statements as to how the contractors 
would perform their duties, including the efficiency savings element. 
In the last case, the Spine Route, there are no formal transfer agreements at present. Previously 
(2002), there was an informal partnership between South Bank Employers Group (SBEG) and 
Lambeth and Southwark Councils (2002). SBEG funded the urban design strategy for the route and 
mobilised its members to fund its implementation. The two local authorities who were responsible 
for maintaining the road once the works were finished. There are ongoing negotiations to transfer 
management of the street to a newly created Business Improvement District, with the involvement 
of the developers and owners of surrounding properties, whose planning gain payments (Section 
106) will provide the capital investment for the street.  
 
4.2.2. Management bodies  
In all but two cases, management bodies were not-for-profit entities incorporated as trusts, 
companies or social enterprises. The exceptions are Myatts Field North Estate and Lewisham Parks, 
where the management body is a private, for-profit company.  
In Myatts Field North Estate, the main contractor is a consortium headed by Regenter and including 
Higgins Construction and Rydon (a construction, development, maintenance and management 
group). Regenter itself is a joint venture between Laing, an international infrastructure investor and 
asset manager, and Pinnacle Regeneration Group (PRG), the holding company for a group of 
businesses in urban regeneration and public services. However, the actual construction and 
management work is contracted out: Pinnacle PSG (a subsidiary of PRG) is responsible for housing 
and estate management; Higgins is responsible for the new build and Rydon undertakes 
refurbishment of existing property, grounds and open space maintenance and communal areas. The 
contract is overseen by a Project Liaison Group (PLG) made up of 3 representatives from Regenter, 
3 from Lambeth Council and 3 residents.  
For Lewisham Parks, the management body is Glendale, a commercial supplier of green spaces 
management and maintenance service with contracts with local authorities, housing associations 
and commercial clients all over the country. In its portfolio of services, Glendale offers grounds 
management, arboriculture, supply of plants and semi-mature trees, woodland management, estate 
management, vegetation control, landscaping, cleansing services and golf course management. The 
branch of Glendale that manages the Lewisham contract is a subsidiary of the national company.  
In many of the cases, the management body is a not-for-profit trust. The Potters Fields Management 
Trust is a not-for-profit company constituted in 2005 to redevelop and manage the park. It is run by 
a Board of Directors made up of 2 representatives from the Council, 1 representative from each 
resident association – Fair Street Community Housing Services and the Shad Thames Residents 
Association - 1 representative from More London estate, 1 representative from the GLA and 1 from 
Team London Bridge Business Improvement District. 
Waterloo Millennium Green is managed by the Bankside Open Spaces Trust (BOST). The trust is a 
charity specialist in horticulture, gardening and the management of urban open spaces, governed 
by a board with 12 trustees and with connections with several residents’ groups in the area. It was 
set up in 2000 and it supports and services a network of parks, community managed green spaces 
and open spaces. It also helps to initiate and run community gardening clubs, awards small grants 
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for local horticulture projects and provides informal horticultural training, landscape maintenance, 
garden maintenance, grounds maintenance and gardening work experience. 
 
Figure 4. Waterloo Millennium Green, an open space managed by a community trust (BOST) 
Similarly, Jubilee Gardens is managed by the Jubilee Gardens Trust (JGT), a trust with charitable 
status setup in 2008 to take over the management of the gardens after redevelopment. The Trust is 
governed by a Board with up to 16 Trustees bringing together neighbouring landowners, local 
businesses and community representatives, and up to 4 co-opted members (Lambeth Council is one 
of them). It is chaired by the Chief Executive Officer of the South Bank Employers Group (SBEG), 
which managed the redevelopment of the gardens for the client the Southbank Centre. SBEG is a 
partnership of seventeen of the major organisations in South Bank, Waterloo and Blackfriars, which 
seeks to promote the area as a destination for leisure and business. It is also the contractor who 
carries out maintenance duties in the park through its Jubilee Gardens Ground Maintenance Team. 
Three of the cases are managed by not-for-profit bodies whose remit is much wider than public 
space management. Bernie Spain Gardens is managed by Coin Street Community Builders (CSCB), 
a social enterprise that owns the land and the cooperative housing around the park. It is controlled 
by a Board elected by CSCB members, all local residents. Its remit includes the development of co-
operative housing; shops, galleries, restaurants, cafes and bars; the development and management 
of  the gardens and the riverside walkway; sports facilities; the organisation of festivals and events; 
the provision of childcare, family support, learning, and enterprise support programmes. 
The open spaces in the Leathermarket Area Estates are managed by the Joint Management Board 
(JMB), Southwark’s largest resident-managed housing organisation, in charge of around 1500 
homes and the grounds of the housing estates in which they are located. It is run by a board of 
directors comprising 2 residents nominated by five TRA (tenant and resident associations), who 
decide on how the estates and their grounds are managed, develop policy and oversee the day-to-
day working of the JMB. An affiliate organisation, Leathermarket RSO (Resident Services 
Organisation) executes the gardening services for JMB and the provision of weekend cleaning 
service. 
The third of these organisations with broader remit is Lower Marsh Market Limited (LMM), a not-for-
profit subsidiary of Waterloo Quarter BID (WQBID), which manages the Lower Marsh street market. 
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Waterloo Quarter is the body that manages a business improvement district south of Waterloo 
Station. As with most BIDs, Waterloo Quarter is constituted as a not-for-profit company, with a 
management board comprising 14 levy-paying local businesses. Its subsidiary LMM has a board 
with two directors, one of whom is the chair of WQBID.  
Finally, the Spine Route is formally managed by the two local authorities, Southwark and Lambeth 
Council, as a part of the local street network. However, the partnership arrangement that saw the 
implementation of the master plan gave a managerial role for SBEG (see the Jubilee Gardens 
above), which was active in coordinating the delivery of the initial round of capital improvements to 
the public realm along the Spine Route. Current negotiations are centred on transferring 
management of the route after a new round of capital investment to the new South Bank Business 
Improvement District, managed by SBEG. 
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Table 3: The nature of management agreements 
Cases Type of agreement Scope of agreement Management body 
Myatts Field North 
Estate 
25-year PFI contract between Lambeth 
Council and Regenter PFI Consortium, (2012) 
Demolition of exiting housing blocks, construction 
and refurbishment of  new housing, community 
centre, commercial units and park, tenant 
management services and management and 
maintenance of council housing and open spaces  
PFI consortium head by Regenter + Higgins 
Construction and Rydon. Regenter is a joint 
venture between Laing and Pinnacle 
Regeneration Group. Management work 
subcontracted to Rydon. Contract overseen by 
Project Liaison Group (PLG) with representatives 
from Regenter, Lambeth Council and residents 
Leathermarket 
Area Estates 
5-year renewable management contract for 
housing and grounds between Southwark 
Council and Leathermarket Joint Management 
Board (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011)  
Tenant management, housing and grounds 
maintenance, minor works and also major works on 
the estate, including redevelopment. 
 
Leathermarket Joint Management Board (JMB), a 
resident-managed housing organisation, led by 
residents nominated by five tenant and residents 
associations.  
Potters Fields 
30-year lease from Southwark Council to 
Potters Fields Management Trust (2005) 
  
Initial redevelopment of the park and full 
management of the park, including minor works and 
maintenance. 
Potters Fields Management Trust, a not-for-profit 
company run by Board of Directors made up of 
representatives from the Council, resident 
associations, More London estates, the GLA and 
Team London Bridge BID  
Waterloo 
Millennium Green 
999-year lease from Lambeth Council to 
Bankside Open Spaces Trust – BOST (2014).  
Full management and maintenance including 
empowering the community to take on greater 
responsibility for the maintenance of the park. 
 
BOST, a charity specialist in horticulture, 
gardening and the management of urban open 
spaces, governed by a board with 12 trustees, 
and connected to residents’ groups  
Bernie Spain 
Gardens 
99-year lease to Coin Street Community 
Builders from the London Residuary Body 
(1992), renewable for another 99 years. 
Full management and maintenance including 
planting, repairing, renewing 
  
Coin Street Community Builders (CSCB) is a 
social enterprise controlled by a Board elected by 
CSCB members, all local residents.  
Spine Route  
No formal transfer agreements at present. 
Previous partnership between South Bank 
Employers Group (SBEG) and Lambeth and 
Southwark Councils (2002). Ongoing 
negotiations to transfer management to BID 
SBEG funded the urban design strategy and 
mobilised its members to fund its implementation. 
Southwark and Lambeth councils are still 
responsible for maintaining the road. 
Road managed by Lambeth and Southwark 
councils. Partnership with SBEG secured capital 
investment for street improvements.  
Lower Marsh 
Market 
Street market management contract (2012), 
between Lambeth Council, Waterloo Quarter 
BID and its subsidiary Lower Marsh Market Ltd  
 
Management of traders and control of vacant 
pitches, management of the commodity mix, trading 
times, the physical appearance of the market, 
cleanliness of the street  
Lower Marsh Market Limited (LMM,) a not-for-
profit subsidiary of Waterloo Quarter BID, with 
two directors, one of whom is the chair of the BID.  
Jubilee Gardens 
135-year sub lease from the Southbank Centre 
to the Jubilee Gardens Trust (2012), with 
complex covenants and restrictions related to 
an underground lease on 1/3 of the site to 
County Hall. 
Provide a park and full responsibility for managing 
and maintaining the site, including enforcing rules 
and regulations 
Jubilee Gardens Trust (JGT), a charity with board 
made up of landowners, local businesses and 
community representatives. Maintenance work 
subcontracted to SBEG’s JG Ground 
Maintenance Team. 
Lewisham Parks 
PFI-style 10-year contract awarded to 
Glendale in 2000. Renewed for another 10-
years in 2010.  
 
Management and maintenance of grounds of public 
housing estates, cleansing, security, liaison with 
user groups, events management. Original contract 
Included up-front capital investment, renewed 
contract has 3% yearly efficiency savings. 
Glendale - commercial supplier of green spaces 
management and maintenance service. 
Lewisham contract managed by a subsidiary of 
the national company. 
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4.3. Contractual agreements and the rights and interests of stakeholders 
The various kinds of contractual arrangements represented by the nine cases recognise and 
privilege the interests of groups of stakeholders in different ways, while attributing rights and 
obligations to them. The way those different stakeholders are represented in the relevant public 
space management body is the main indicator of how far their interests are recognised by the 
contractual agreement and how they are positioned in relation to other, potentially conflictive, 
interests.  
Although the range of potential stakeholders can be large, for the purposes of this research the 
stakeholders represented in the 9 management agreements have been grouped in three basic 
categories: 
 Residents: those living around or in the vicinity of the public space, whose interests over that 
public space are normally associated with those of the community, and are recognised in most 
management transfer agreements 
 Businesses: businesses located around or in the vicinity of the public space, with an interest on 
how the space is run and on its uses because of impacts on the business, on its employees or 
on asset value. This group also includes local commercial landlords 
 Users/General Public: general users and visitors to the public space and its facilities, including 
tourists and passers-by who are not local residents 
There is no suggestion that those three categories are internally homogeneous, and there might be 
significant differences in interests within them, e.g. residents of existing council housing estates and 
residents of new private housing, or small businesses and large corporates. In some cases this is 
indeed relevant, and the text refers to the multiple way groups and subgroups are recognised and 
represented in the management agreements.  
The first group is that of local residents, in the sense of those living in the immediate vicinity of the 
spaces. They are recognised as important stakeholders in all agreements and their interests and 
aspirations are directly represented in the majority of the management bodies, albeit with different 
degrees of strength. Residents have direct representation in the management board in four of the 
cases. In the Leathermarket Area Estates, they are naturally the main group of stakeholders, and 
representatives of the five tenants and residents’ association make up the whole of JMB board of 
directors. In the charitable trust managing Potters Fields, residents have two of seven seats in the 
board, one for a representative from Fair Street Community Housing Service (the neighbouring 
council housing estate) and another from the Shad Thames Residents Association (a private housing 
estate). A third representative is likely to be included once the private residential development 
bordering the park is completed and occupied. At Bernie Spain Gardens, those local residents that 
are members of the Coin Street Community Builders co-operative (i.e. have lived in the area for at 
least three years) are represented in the CSCB Board, which they elect. In the case of Jubilee 
Gardens, the 16-strong board has one seat for residents of the neighbouring private estate County 
Hall through their residents’ association; another for CSCB representing residents of the nearby 
cooperative housing; one for the Waterloo Community Development Group (a resident-based 
pressure group focusing on land use planning); and indirectly another one from BOST, with its 
connection to residents’ groups (see below). 
In three other cases, residents’ interests are represented in steering groups with varying degrees of 
power over the operation of the public space management body. In Myatts Field North Estate, the 
residents’ association for the Council housing estate have three of the nine seats of the Project 
Liaison Group, the steering group that oversees the PFI operation and decides on strategic matters 
related to it. Once the private housing component of the new development is completed and 
occupied, its residents will also have some kind of representation in the Liaison Group, although the 
precise form is still to be defined. In the Waterloo Millennium Green local residents are represented 
directly in a steering group that advises BOST. BOST also has formal links with residents’ groups 
from the wider South Bank area (Blackfriars Settlement, Bankside Residents Forum and Waterloo 
Community Development Group), which influence the agenda of BOST beyond this specific public 
space. Finally, local residents are included in the Lower Marsh Market steering group, which has a 
strategic oversight of the market operation. In this case however, it is individuals that participate in 
the steering group, rather than organised representation of residents.  
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In the remaining two cases, residents have no formalised representation in management 
arrangements. In the case of Lewisham Parks, residents’ groups such as the Blackheath Society 
around Blackheath Park do engage with the management body, Glendale. However, their input is 
more similar to that of a consultee or lobbying group mobilising their contacts inside the local council, 
rather than an input from a member formally recognised as part of the decision making or the 
operation management team. In the Spine Route, where arrangements have been less formal and 
are still being negotiated, some residents have had their interests represented through the lobbying 
role of residents’ groups such as the County Hall residents’ association or the Coin Street Community 
Builders; or residents-led community organisations such as the Waterloo Community Development 
Group; or more generally, in an indirect way through the two elected local authorities.  
The second group of stakeholders are the local businesses. They were not relevant in the 
predominantly residential context of Leathermarket Area Estates, or Bernie Spain Gardens or the 
Myatt Field North Estate. The only type of business interests recognised directly in the latter are 
those of the PFI consortium Regenter itself, its members and subcontractors, whose interests, rights 
and obligations are set out in detail in the PFI contract. This is also the case with Lewisham Parks. 
Local businesses and employers’ interests might be represented in friends’ groups where relevant, 
but on a consultee or lobbying capacity, and the only business interests directly represented in the 
arrangement are those of contractors Glendale.  
In three of the other cases, local businesses were directly represented in the board of the 
management body. In Potters Fields, two of the seven seats in the trust board are occupied by 
business representatives: one by private office estate More London, representing their own interests 
as landowners and those of the occupiers of their buildings, and one by Team London Bridge BID 
representing its business membership (the BID levy-payer occupier of commercial property in the 
area). In Jubilee Gardens, the board includes representatives of large businesses and landowners 
(the London Eye, the Shell Centre, the Southbank Centre), of small businesses (2 at the time of 
writing), and of local business association the South Bank Employers Group (SBEG), whose 
representative chairs the board. In the case of the Spine Route, local business and landowners’ 
interests were represented by SBEG in the original partnership, and are still represented in the 
ongoing negotiations by SBEG, the new Southbank BID, the Coin Street Community Builders (as 
major landowners) and the developers and commercial landowners for the new developments along 
the route. 
 
Figure 5. Lower Marsh market. Interests of market traders and street retailers 
accommodated in the Lower Marsh Market Steering Group. With permission from Waterloo Quarter 
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In the two remaining cases, business interests are represented in steering groups advising the main 
management body. Local businesses are represented in BOST Steering Group in the case of 
Waterloo Millennium Green, either directly and or indirectly through the presence in it of Waterloo 
Quarter BID representing its levy-paying members. The management arrangements for Lower 
Marsh Market are focused around the interests of market traders and retailers along the street. Both 
groups are members of the Lower Marsh Market Steering Group, where they can voice their interests 
directly. Additionally, some of the street retailers are also levy-paying members of the Waterloo 
Quarter BID, LMM Ltd parent company and therefore are also represented indirectly through the 
BID.  
The third group of stakeholders comprises all other users and the general public. Some categories 
of users are indirectly represented in the management arrangements as their interests coincide with 
others that are directly represented. This is especially the case with local workers. This group of 
users is formed of people working for the businesses around the 9 public spaces and using these 
spaces at lunch time or walking past them to get to work. They do not have direct representation in 
any of the arrangements but their interests are explicitly protected by their employers, who are 
indeed represented in the agreements. This is the case in Potters Field, where the interests of local 
workers is mainly represented by More London estate and Team London Bridge BID, both in the 
board; or the case of Jubilee Gardens, through the presence of the Southbank Centre, the Shell 
Centre, SBEG and other employers in the board. Similarly, in the case of Lower Marsh Market 
workers are indirectly represented by their employers’ membership of the Waterloo Quarter BID 
(WQB), the parent company of LMM. WQB plays the same role albeit less directly in the case of the 
Waterloo Millennium Green through its work with BOST, the managers. 
Other users and especially the interests of non-local borough residents and businesses are 
represented indirectly by the elected local authority, in their role as protectors of the ‘public interest’, 
as freeholders of the spaces, or as main clients in the management contracts. This is a 
straightforward role in the Spine Route as it is an adopted road under the management of Southwark 
and Lambeth Councils. 
In Potters Fields, Southwark Council was responsible for setting the terms of the lease in its role as 
freeholders of the land, and also have a sit in the board of the trust. In this particular case, given its 
location, the Greater London Authority has also a place in the board in its capacity both as both as 
policy maker for London and neighbouring ‘resident/business’. In Jubilee Gardens, Lambeth Council 
also has a sit in the board, but as a co-opted member without full voting rights.  
In most of the cases however, the local authority represents wider borough interests in their role as 
main client and monitoring body for the management agreement. In Waterloo Millennium Green, 
Lambeth Council does not sit on the management board, but as freeholder it set the terms of the 
lease – which included the position of park within the borough general open space policies, and it 
acts as monitoring body for the leaseholders and managers BOST. In Myatts Field North Estate, 
Lambeth Council is both the client defining the terms of the PFI contract and a member of the Project 
Liaison Team, which oversees the contract and monitors the performance of the contractors. In the 
Lower Marsh Market, Lambeth Council is the main client in the contract, and also has chairs the 
Lower Marsh Market Steering Group. A similar situation happens in the Leathermarket Area Estates 
and in Lewisham Parks: in the former, Southwark Council is the main client setting up the terms of 
the contract and with monitoring rights over the management body; in the latter, Lewisham Council 
is the client setting the terms of the quasi-PFI contract and monitoring the performance of contractors 
Glendale. 
The only case without direct involvement of the local authority as representatives of borough-wide 
interests is Bernie Spain Gardens. The local authority is not the freeholder of the site and has no 
participation in the CSCB board. However, as member of several local partnerships and groupings 
(SBEG, the new BID, etc.), CSCB is responsive to local authority strategies on public spaces which 
represent the ‘public interest’. 
Table 4 summarises how the interests and rights of those key stakeholders are recognised and 
included in the contractual agreements.   
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Table 4: Interests and rights in management arrangements 
 
 
4.4. Contractual allocation of management responsibilities 
The analytical framework suggested in section 2 assumes that publicness might be affected 
differently by the contracting out of public space management, depending on which type of 
management responsibility is transferred - i.e. coordination, regulation, maintenance and investment 
- and the extension to which this happens. Coordination includes strategic and operational decision-
making about the space and its management; regulation covers the setting up of rules of behaviour, 
rules of access and opening times and their enforcement; maintenance comprises the organisation 
and operation of maintenance routines; investment includes capital and revenue investment, repairs 
and maintenance costs. The following paragraphs describe the similarities and differences in the 
allocation of management responsibilities for each case. Table 5 presents a summary of how 
management responsibilities are allocated. 
 
4.4.1. Coordination 
The cases show two different ways in which the transfer of coordination responsibilities has been 
done: full transfer and partial transfer. Most of the cases fall within the first category and they present 
a full transfer of strategic and operational decision-making responsibilities from the local authority to 
a management organisation. This is the case of Leathermarket Estates, Potters Fields, Waterloo 
Millennium Green, Bernie Spain Gardens and Jubilee Gardens. Full transfer means that the 
management organisations (JMB; BOST; CSCB; and JGT) have full autonomy to choose their 
contractors and run the services as they see fit. The local authority plays a monitoring role in the 
management of these spaces and its relationship with the management organisations is mediated 
through the contract that sets up the benchmarks and indicators to assess the organisations’ 
performance – i.e. a Right to Manage contract in the Leathermarket estates case and long-lease 
contract in the others. 
Cases Summary 
Myatts Field North 
Estate 
Residents interests are in principle the main driver of management – through 
involvement in the decision making body and through the Council’s role as the 
freeholder of the grounds.  
The Council plays a preeminent role in the allocation and negotiation of rights and 
obligations and represents the public interest 
Leathermarket Area 
Estates 
Residents’ interests are the main driver of  management -through involvement in the 
decision making body  
General public interest represented by the Council in the lease contract but no direct 
representation at the decision making body 
Potters Fields 
A balanced representation of the different stakeholders’ interests in the decision 
making body. 
General Public interest represented both in the lease agreement and in the decision 
making body through representatives of the Council and  the GLA 
Waterloo Millennium 
Green 
Residents’ and Businesses’ interests represented at the decision making body. 
General Public interest represented in the lease contract but no direct representation 
at the decision making body.  
Bernie Spain Gardens 
CSCB member interests are predominant. General Public interest is not directly 
represented.  
Spine Route  
General Public interest dominates, with different stakeholders negotiating the position 
of their interests in the potential new agreement.   
Lower Marsh Market 
A balanced representation of the different stakeholders’ interests in the decision 
making body. 
General Public interest represented both in the lease agreement and in the decision 
making body through the Council representative.  
Jubilee Gardens 
Trust’s interests encompass those of the more active user groups (some residents, 
landowners, surrounding institutions and businesses).  
General Public interest is represented indirectly by advisory presence of local 
authority in the board. 
Lewisham Parks 
No user group is predominant. 
General Public interest represented in the lease contract but no direct representation 
at the decision making body. 
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The second group of cases is characterised by a partial transfer of responsibilities, where the 
strategic coordination is kept by local authorities and the operational level is allocated to the 
management organisations. This is clearly the case of Lewisham Parks and Lower Marsh Market. 
However, the scope for the operational coordination of Lower Marsh Market is narrower compared 
to that of Lewisham Parks. In the latter, Glendale is in charge of all the areas of operational 
management for Lewisham Parks, including funding and community involvement, whereas in the 
former, WQB is only responsible for the coordination of the market operation and related services 
and the liaison between the market, the shops and the residents. The contracts also reflect the 
differences in the allocation of operational responsibilities. Glendale relationship with Lewisham local 
authority is set in a management contract whereas in the case of Lower Marsh Market, the 
relationship is formalised in a managing license. Myatts Field North re-development also forms part 
of this second group although it presents a more complex allocation of coordination responsibilities 
than in the previous cases. Here, the strategic coordination has been allocated to the Liaison Group, 
which is formed of representatives from the local authority, the residents and the Consortium 
(Regenter). In addition, the operational coordination has been allocated to the Consortium, which 
employs a grounds management company (Rydon) to run the day-to-day services. In this case, the 
complex transfer of responsibilities between the local authority and the external organisation has 
been formalised in a 25-year PFI contract.  
The Spine Route case presents a situation in which all the coordination responsibilities are still within 
the remit of the local authorities (Southwark and Lambeth). However, the local authorities are being 
challenged by the new Southbank BID, managed by SBEG, due to the poor maintenance of street. 
SBEG was involved in the delivery of the first round of capital improvements on the street some 12 
years ago and has argued that the local authorities have not been able to keep its quality standards 
to a good condition. Accordingly, the BID is lobbying to become the management company for the 
local authorities in order to provide a better and more homogenised service in the area, including the 
Spine Route. They are currently in negotiations with both local authorities but no decision has yet 
been made in this regard at the time of writing, and it is not clear which form it would take in case 
there was a transfer of responsibilities.  
 
4.4.2. Regulation 
 
Figure 6. Use and access rules set out by managing Trust in Jubilee Gardens. 
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The wide variety of arrangements in the regulation of behaviour, access and opening times for the 
different cases confirms the relevance that the ‘context’ plays in their management. However, the 
process that leads to the different type of regulation arrangements is common to almost all the case 
studies. In general, local needs and demands represented by the management organisations are 
negotiated with the local authorities, who represent the wider needs and aspirations of the borough. 
There are only two cases, Jubilee Gardens and Bernie Spain Gardens, where the regulation of the 
space has been determined by the management organisations. Interestingly, in both cases the lease 
agreements give the management organisation virtual ownership of the land. Jubilee Gardens has 
been outside the control of an elected public body for some 30 years, when the ownership of the site 
was transferred from the defunct Greater London Council (GLC) to the Southbank Centre.  Similarly, 
CSCB has full rights over Bernie Spain Gardens by virtue of their lease agreement with the London 
Residuary Body (LRB), managers of the estate of the GLC and freeholders of the land. 
Consequently, it could be argued that these two examples are de facto ‘private spaces’ open to the 
general public. The enforcement of rules in these two examples is carried out by private security 
teams, although criminal matters are dealt with by the police. As for the rest of the cases, 
enforcement powers are largely retained by the council, with warden services contributing to the 
surveillance of those areas and increasing the deterrent effect. 
 
4.4.3. Maintenance 
Operation and maintenance routines have been fully transferred to the management organisations 
in all cases but the Spine Route, where they still lie with the local authorities. However, each case 
has a slightly different way of managing the day-to-day upkeep of the spaces. In the case of Potters 
Field and Bernie Spain Gardens, the management organisations employ specialist contractors to 
carry out daily maintenance. The contractors’ activity and performance in Bernie Spain Gardens is 
regulated in accordance to the standards set up by CSCB, whereas in Potters Fields these standards 
are set up by the Potter Fields Trust Management Plan and a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with 
the local authority. 
Myatts Field North and Jubilee Gardens are slightly different from the previous two examples. In their 
case, the maintenance is also contracted out to a grounds management contractor, Rydon and 
JGGMT respectively, who are responsible for contracting the specialists needed and monitoring that 
their job is done to the required standards set up by Regenter and JGT.  
JMB and BOST are carrying the maintenance of their spaces with their in-house teams but they also 
count with some support from charities and other voluntary groups. Groundwork and St Mungo’s 
Broadway charities assist JMB with the gardening activities in Leathermarket Estates while BOST 
works alongside different voluntary groups in Waterloo Millennium Gardens to carry out different 
maintenance tasks (litter picking, for instance). In both cases, the maintenance standards are set 
out in their management plans. Myatts Field North could also be part of these group of ‘collaborative 
maintenance’ examples, since some parts of the park will be maintained by a community 
organisation, The Happenings, once re-developed. They are also expected to take over the 
management of the MUGA (multi-use games area) being developed on site, but the terms of their 
future relation with Rydon or the consortium is not yet known. 
There is another group of cases in which the management organisations carry all the maintenance 
themselves, without any support from voluntary or community groups. This is the case of WQB in 
Lower Marsh Market, responsible for the maintenance of the market infrastructure, and Glendale in 
Lewisham Parks, responsible for all the maintenance tasks in the parks across the borough. 
Finally, the maintenance of the Spine Route is still carried out by the two local authorities (Southwark 
and Lambeth) and by landlords County Hall in the privately-own stretch of land at the route’s western 
end. As mentioned earlier, SBEG are lobbying to become the maintenance provider in the area but 
the outcome of the negotiations with the local authorities was not yet clear at the time of writing. 
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4.4.4. Investment 
The cases illustrate three different forms of transfer of investment responsibilities: full transfer with 
payback payments by local authorities over a period of time; full transfer with no payback payments 
but with some sort of public support; and full transfer with no payback payments or any other type of 
public funding. 
Myatts Fields North and Lewisham Parks are in the first group. In both cases, the initial capital 
investment came from the management organisation (the PFI consortium and Glendale) and should 
be paid back by the corresponding local authority as unitary charges, over a period of 25 years in 
Myatts Fields North and 10 years in Lewisham Parks. Maintenance costs are also paid back by the 
local authorities but in the Lewisham case, the renewed contract (2010) includes a ‘savings clause’, 
which transfers to Glendale the responsibility to find resources to make up for reduced maintenance 
payment transfers. Future capital investments are not included in any of the current contracts and 
will have to be negotiated in the future. In addition, some revenue-generating facilities in Myatts 
Fields North have been transferred to The Happenings while in the Lewisham case these facilities 
have been transferred to Glendale. The commercial income they get out from them is mostly 
employed to cover the ‘saving clause’ of their contract. 
 
Figure 7. Section 106 monies cover capital investment in the Spine Route. 
The second type of transfer applies to most of the cases, namely Waterloo Millennium Green, Bernie 
Spain Gardens, the Spine Route, Lower Marsh Market and Jubilee Gardens, although, public funding 
covers different items in each. For instance, most capital investment comes from Section 106 monies 
in Jubilee Gardens and the Spine Route, whereas in the other two cases, public funding is marginal 
and comes from grants and/or Section 106 monies. Capital investment for Waterloo Millennium 
Green and Bernie Spain Gardens is raised by management organisations from different sources: 
BOST has received money from the Government’s Lottery Fund whereas CSCB combines loans, 
commercial income and fees from renting Bernie Spain Gardens for different public and private 
events. In all those cases routine maintenance is funded by the management organisations, with 
money raised variously from sponsorships and commercial activity with the exception of the Spine 
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Route (local authority-maintained) and Jubilee Gardens due to the nature of the lease agreement 
that forbids any commercial activity in the park. In this case, Section 106 monies and private 
donations are the main sources to fund maintenance. 
Finally, the third type of transfer applies to Leathermarket Estates and Potters Fields cases. The 
context of each case has an impact on the number of funding sources available to cover the capital 
investments and maintenance costs. JMB currently obtains funding for capital investment and 
maintenance out of the rents and service charge revenues from residents of Leathermarket Estates. 
Although JMB received local authority payments for management services in the first years of the 
contract, it no longer has this support. Consequently, JMB is dependent on its ability to retain and 
manage the funding obtained from the tenants. The rest of the costs are covered with the money it 
gets from grants and sponsorship. In the case of Potters Field, the revenue raised from events and 
fees for commercial uses is currently the only source of funding available to the Trust, although it did 
receive some Section 106 monies for capital investment in the early years of operation. 
 
Table 5: Allocation of management responsibilities 
Cases Summary 
Myatts Field North 
Estate 
Highly detailed transfer of full range of responsibilities in complex PFI contract. Clear 
client-contractor relationship between Council and Regenter and its subcontractors, 
with highly formalised monitoring mechanisms and with transfer of operational 
responsibilities in coordination, maintenance and investment, but not regulation.  
Leathermarket Area 
Estates 
Transfer of full range of responsibilities by Right to Manage contract. Clear client-
contractor relationship between Council and JMB, with formalised monitoring 
mechanisms, but tempered by the community sector nature of JMB. Transfer of all 
management responsibilities, but with Council oversight. 
Potters Fields 
Transfer of full range of responsibilities by lease agreement. Lessor – lessee 
relationship between Council and Trust, framed and monitored by an approved plan 
and Service Level Agreement, and council presence in Trust. Transfer of all 
management responsibilities within the terms of the lease. 
Waterloo Millennium 
Green 
Transfer of most responsibilities by lease agreement. Lessor-lessee relationship 
between Council and BOST, framed and restrained by works programme and 
maintenance schedule included in Service Level Agreement and inclusion of park in 
local authority open spaces strategies.  
Bernie Spain Gardens 
Full transfer of rights and responsibilities in long lease. Local authority – private 
landowner relationship between Council and CSCB. 
Spine Route  
Undefined distribution of responsibilities, with SBEG already involved in some 
coordination and investment and pushing for involvement in maintenance. 
Lower Marsh Market 
Transfer of specific, street market-related responsibilities through managing license, 
with relationship client-contractors between council and WQB within an environment 
managed  by the council and some overlap of responsibilities 
Jubilee Gardens 
Transfer of rights and responsibilities by lease agreement, with lessor and lessee 
relationship between the Southbank Centre and JGT, and one of client-contractor 
between JGT and SBEG, within the terms of a complex and prescriptive lease 
arrangement. 
Lewisham Parks 
Highly detailed transfer of mostly maintenance and investment responsibilities through 
a quasi-PFI contract. Clear client-contractor relationship between council and 
Glendale with highly formalised specifications and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
 
4.5. Openness/accessibility and accountability 
Section 2 defined publicness as a function of openness and accessibility, which comprise the rights 
of access and of use of a space, and of accountability, which comprises how stakes over a space 
are recognised and given a voice in the governance of that space. The following section describes 
the arrangements to determine rights access and use (i.e. openness and accessibility) and the 
mechanisms for incorporating and responding to the aspirations of key stakeholders (i.e. 
accountability) in each case. Table 6 summarises the section, setting out the key players in each of 
the two dimensions of publicness and the key processes determining openness, accessibility and 
accountability. 
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4.5.1. Openness and Accessibility 
All of the nine cases are open to the general public without significant restrictions, including the 
virtually privately owned Bernie Spain Gardens and Jubilee Gardens, and all allow for a great variety 
of different activities to happen in them. However, the extension of ownership rights over the land in 
those two cases does seem to have a relevant impact on the regulation of openness and accessibility 
rights, since these are not subject to negotiation with a wider range of stakeholders. CSCB and the 
Jubilee Gardens Trust are the sole responsible for setting up the regulations of openness and 
accessibility in Bernie Spain Gardens and Jubilee Gardens, and they have done it according to their 
own ethos and their member’s interests. By contrast, the rest of the cases show a more complex 
arrangement of actors negotiating regulations of openness and accessibility. More importantly, local 
authorities play a relevant part in the drafting of these rules, be it through their contractual 
agreements with the management organisation - as in Myatts Fields North, Potters Fields and 
Lewisham Parks – or through the by-laws adopted as a default for the guiding set of rules – as in 
Leathermarket Estates, Potters Fields, Waterloo Millennium Gardens, Lower Marsh Market and the 
Spine Route. 
In spite of any differences in the regulation of the rights of use and access, in all the nine cases, 
‘neighbours’ (namely surrounding residents, landowners and businesses) tend to have a greater 
impact in the way openness and accessibility are regulated than any other stakeholder - i.e. the 
general public. This is especially clear in the Leathermarket Estate case, where access and the 
regulation of activities in the open spaces – e.g. ball games or dog walking - are mainly decided by 
the residents’ associations. Similarly, openness and accessibility to Bernie Spain Gardens are 
regulated to provide a well maintained family friendly environment, in tune with the desires of CCSB 
cooperative housing residents living around the space. Consequently, it could be argued that 
physical proximity to the site defines the dominant interests in the regulation of the rights of access 
and use. 
 
Figure 8. Area of Bernie Spain Gardens rented out for an event. 
Revenue-raising events that close off some parts of public space for fee-paying customers do affect 
openness and accessibility of the places where they happen. They also have the potential of being 
contentious and create distinction in access and use between fee payers and others. Indeed, this 
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has been contentious in a number of occasions. Management organisations have been challenged 
by surrounding residents on the nature of those events, especially when they generate noise or an 
excessive number of visitors, but not often on the restrictions to access and use that come with those 
events. Because of this potential for conflicts, all the cases in which the hiring of the space for events 
is allowed (Potters Field, Bernie Spain Gardens, Lewisham Parks, Lower Marsh Market) have 
complex mechanisms for deciding the number, character and size of the events and the restriction 
to public access they can cope with, which normally incorporates the ‘neighbours’ and in some cases 
the local authority. 
 
4.5.2. Accountability 
The accountability variable comprises the ways in which stakeholders are recognised and given a 
voice in the governance of a particular space. The analysis of the cases shows that accountability 
varies according to two main factors: lines of accountability– i.e. who is accountable to whom and 
how clear this relation is - and nature of the decisions– i.e. the type of decisions stakeholders are 
accountable to, namely strategic or operational decisions.  
Boards, Steering and Liaison groups are the main mechanisms of internal accountability, providing 
a forum for those stakeholders recognised in the agreements to voice their aspirations. However, 
although members of the Board (or Steering or Liaison group) are directly accountable to the group 
of stakeholders they represent, there is no direct accountability to other interests. This is the case 
with Potters Fields, Jubilee Gardens, Lower Marsh Market and Waterloo Millennium Gardens, whose 
governing boards include a wide variety of voices – from residents to businesses, local authorities 
and the GLA – but accountability to the general public for the decisions taken is less clear and 
depends on the mediating role of the local authority. The cases of Myatts Field North Estate, Bernie 
Spain Gardens and Leathermarket Area Estates are more extreme in that they show exclusive lines 
of accountability between the managing organisation and one group of stakeholders (residents of 
particular housing estates). The aspirations of other stakeholders, be they the general public or other 
residents, are only indirectly represented either by the local authority or by partnerships between the 
managing organisation and local organisations. 
All cases show clear lines of accountability between the management organisations and the local 
authorities, which represent the general public and borough-wide interests. These lines are set out 
in the transfer agreement, which in turn determines the nature of the relationship between both 
bodies. In the cases in which this relationship is of a client-contractor nature (Myatts Field North, 
Leathermarket Area Estate, Lower Marsh Market, Lewisham Parks and possibly the Spine Route), 
accountability is quite direct and is structured through detailed performance indicators, service 
specifications, monitoring targets and sanctions for non-compliance embedded in the contract. In 
two other cases, in which that relationship is of a lessor-lessee nature (Potters Field and, Waterloo 
Millennium Gardens), accountability between the management organisation and the local authority 
is more of a strategic nature and is defined through the structure and terms of the lease, which 
specifies its purpose, expected outcomes and sanctions for deviating from those. The same applies 
albeit indirectly to the cases of Bernie Spain Gardens and Jubilee Gardens. The lessor in those 
cases are other public bodies (the London Residuary Body and the Southbank Centre), but the 
leases include similar terms as the two previous cases. However, as the local authority is not the 
main part in the leases, it has only indirect powers to ensure compliance with those terms, mostly 
through negotiation and pressure. 
The system of accountability described above cover both strategic decisions (e.g. the role of the 
space, the facilities it should have, its place in wider public space strategies, basic accessibility and 
openness principles) and operational ones (e.g. maintenance regimes, daily implementation of 
access and use rules). Most of those strategic decisions are already embedded in the contracts and 
leases, which specify the nature of the space, its purpose and uses, and how these should be 
secured. Moreover, it is worth noting that local authorities are directly involved in the strategic 
decisions in all but one case, which makes the latter accountable to a wider constituency than that 
directly represented in the transfer agreements. In Bernie Spain Gardens the involvement is indirect, 
through the participation of the management body in local partnerships with the local authority.  
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The picture is different as regards operational decisions. In general, local authorities tend to have a 
reduced presence in the decision making process of operational decisions – i.e. day-to-day 
management issues such as dog access, ball games or litter picking. These are generally negotiated 
between space mangers and the key the stakeholders and formalised via the clear internal 
accountability mechanisms of trust boards, steering groups or liaison groups discussed earlier. In 
addition, the regular presence of wardens, gardeners and other staff on site allows for direct and 
informal interaction between the stakeholders and the management organisation, increasing 
people’s engagement with the management of the spaces. .  
There is however some accountability of operational decisions to the local authority and therefore to 
wider interests beyond the key stakeholders. In some cases, this is more significant and relates to 
specifications and performance indicators included in transfer contracts or leases, as in Lewisham 
Parks, Myatts Field North, Lower Marsh Market and Potters Fields. In most cases, this is a result of 
local authority presence in the management organisation through seats in the board, or contractual 
monitoring powers which happens in all the cases but Bernie Spain Gardens. What might vary from 
one case to the other is the relative power the local authority has on the decision making process for 
operational matters. This depends amongst other things on the number of stakeholders in the boards 
of the managing organisation, or on the nature of the engagement of the local authority with it. In this 
sense, number of stakes acknowledged over a space in the management organisation is the key 
factor affecting local authorities’ hold over the process. In other words, the greater the number of 
local stakes over a space, the smaller the scope for the aspirations of ‘the general public’ to be taken 
into account at the level of operational decisions. 
 
 
Figure 9. The GLA building in Potters Fields. 
As a neighbour, the GLA is one of the stakeholders sitting at the Trust management board. Copyright Daviddje 
Creative Commons 
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Table 6: The dimensions of publicness 
Cases Summary of Key Determinants of Publicness 
Myatts Field 
North Estate 
Openness and accessibility set out by local authority and hinging on contract compliance 
monitoring. 
Accountability lines client-contractor set out in PFI contract; hinging on contract monitoring 
and effectiveness/power of Liaison Group. 
Leathermarket 
Area Estates 
Openness and accessibility set out and delivered by residents’ association. Openness and 
accessibility hinging on commitment to openness from JMB, framed by the terms of the 
contract with the local authority  
Accountability lines client-contractor set out in transfer contract; hinging on contract 
monitoring and effectiveness of relationship residents’ association – JMB – local authority 
Potters Fields 
Openness and accessibility set out by local authority hinging on commitment to openness 
from groups represented in the Trust’s Board of Directors, framed by terms of the lease. 
Accountability hinging on the functioning of the Board and its relationship with local 
authority 
Waterloo 
Millennium Green 
Openness and accessibility set out by local authority and hinging on commitment to 
openness from contractor, framed by terms of the lease. 
Accountability hinging on contract monitoring and effectiveness of relationship client - 
contractor. 
Bernie Spain 
Gardens 
Openness and accessibility set out by CSCB, framed by their own regulations. Hinging on 
commitment to ‘family friendly’ environment. 
Accountability hinging on board of resident’s interests. 
Spine Route  
Openness and accessibility for most of the route as for any adopted road, excluding private 
tract set out by landlords County Hall. Openness and accessibility hinging on council 
representativeness and future role of SBEG/BID. 
Accountability through local authority. It might hinge on balance of responsibilities/power of 
any future arrangement. 
Lower Marsh 
Market 
Openness and accessibility for street set out by local authority, hinging on the monitoring 
and negotiation of contract and of market operation. 
Accountability hinging on effectiveness of overseeing role by Council and relationship 
market managers - traders 
Jubilee Gardens 
Openness and accessibility set out by Trust, hinging on commitment to openness from 
groups represented in Trust, framed by terms of the lease. 
Accountability hinging on the functioning of the Trust and its overseeing role over 
contractors. 
Lewisham Parks 
Openness and accessibility set out by local and hinging on contract compliance monitoring. 
Accountability hinging on contract monitoring and effectiveness of relationship client - 
contractor. 
 
 
4.6 Typologies of publicness 
The previous sections looked at the different issues that can influence publicness in contracted out 
management agreements: the context of each case in terms of location in the wider city, the nature 
of the surrounding area and the range of interests each space is likely to attract; how the interests 
of three types of key stakeholders were treated in the management transfer agreements; the 
allocation of the four key management responsibilities among the parties in the agreement; how 
openness, accessibility and accountability are shaped by the transfer agreements. This section tries 
to condense the findings for each case, to allow for commonalities among the cases to emerge.  
The variable context sets the range of potential interests around a public space and defines which 
are more likely to be involved in management. Some of the spaces are in central locations with a 
wide range of stakeholders with multiple objectives pressing for a say in how those spaces are 
managed and thus requiring arrangements capable of incorporating that complexity. Other spaces 
have only local interest, with one or a few clearly defined stakeholders. The main differences among 
the cases are therefore centred on the range of interests and stakeholders, whether just local interest 
with few and clearly defined stakeholders, or wider and more complex sets of interests, stakeholders 
and degrees of ‘definability’. 
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Rights and obligations define the relative power in management arrangements and whose interests 
the arrangements respond to. Dominant interests are those incorporated into contracts, in some 
cases meditated by the local authority as a main party retaining important controlling rights; in others 
without mediation, with local residents/businesses/landlords acting directly as dominant players. The 
main differences in the cases lie around the roles of the local authority, local residents/business or 
other stakeholders, whose interests are paramount in the contractual arrangement and how they are 
balanced. 
Allocation of management responsibilities specifies the type of relationship between the 
management and the public body owning the space, and the amount and type of power/control 
transferred through the management agreement.  In some of the cases there is a transfer of a full 
range of responsibilities, including strategic management and funding whereas others are more 
restrictive and maintain some strategic functions with the local authority/public body; some are highly 
prescriptive in their description of responsibilities, and others are more flexible allowing managers a 
greater discretion. What differentiates the cases is the nature of the relationship between the 
management body and the space owner (lessor/lessee, client/contractor), how prescriptive and/or 
wide ranging the agreement is (full management, operational only), and how management should 
be funded (self-funded or transfers/payment from public bodies) 
Finally, publicness defines how openness/accessibility and accountability are interpreted in the 
arrangements. Some arrangements make the space open and accessible as any other public space, 
whereas others assume a degree of self-regulation by the stakeholders, with some additional 
restrictions. Accountability mechanisms in some cases are clear and direct in their lines of 
communication between stakeholders and managers, but in others are more complex and mediated. 
Some cases are directly inclusive of all main potential stakeholders while others are exclusive to one 
or two main stakeholders (with only indirect accountability to others through the local authority). All 
in all, the cases differ in the degree of openness and accessibility compared to other public spaces; 
their degree of self-regulation; the level of clarity and complexity of the accountability mechanisms 
for the recognised stakeholders; and whether each case is inclusive of all main stakeholders or 
restricted to one dominant set of interests. 
Looking at the nine cases and common features amongst them it is possible to distinguish three 
basic types of ‘publicness’, defined by the array of stakeholders involved in management, the extent 
to which they can define and regulate basic rules of access and use and their ability to influence and 
control management strategies. The first type encompasses those cases with a largely self-regulated 
type of publicness, directly shaped and controlled by surrounding residents, business and 
landowners and their interests and aspirations. The second type represents  a fully contractualised 
form of publicness, in which rules for use and access and management responsibilities and control 
over it are defined in contract specifications, with clear and separate roles for the public body that 
owns the space (the client) and the management body (the contractor) that mediates between the 
interests of clearly defined stakeholders. Finally, the third type refers to a more restricted contractual 
arrangement, which applies to only some dimensions of the space and its management and 
therefore only allows for partial intervention of stakeholders in shaping rules of access, use and 
space management. The three types are explained in more detail below and their implications for 
public space publicness are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
First type: Stakeholder-shaped publicness 
These are spaces whose management incorporates a wide range of interests, with strong 
representation of stakeholders. They are seeking to secure the fullest possible transfer of 
management responsibilities (including funding), ownership rights and a more equal relationship with 
local authority/public body. In this case, the transfer leads to some form of self-regulated 
openness/accessibility and accountability mechanisms that are complex but inclusive to the 
recognised stakeholders. Other interests are represented by the local authority. 
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This type includes spaces managed by trusts and social enterprises with clear and legally defined 
lines of accountability to its members, all of them organisations with a clear and direct stake in the 
public space. Transfer of management involves a long lease with its own conditions, creating a 
lessee-lessor relationship with the public body that owns the freehold of the land, and giving the 
lessee almost full ownership rights, including in some cases the right to raise revenues from rental 
of the space and facilities. The transfer of responsibilities tends to be extensive although within the 
parameters set by the lease. Whether a trustee and/or freeholder of the land, the local authority is a 
part of the arrangement, albeit occasionally a minor one, setting and securing compliance with 
policies and acting as representative of dispersed interests in the borough. 
 
Second type: Full contracted-out publicness 
This type comprises spaces in which the management is taken over by one key stakeholder, with 
the local authority in a strong position to retain strategic overseeing role while delegating 
management. These are spaces under council by-laws, with some self-regulating openness and 
accessibility but within a very tight framework set out in detailed contractual agreements. 
Accountability mechanisms are clear but complex, securing an exclusive say by the main 
stakeholders in each arrangement. As in the first type, there is weak and diffuse accountability for 
other stakeholders, many of which are indirectly represented by the local authority’s presence in the 
management body.  
 
Figure 10. All open spaces in Lewisham are managed by one private contractor, under complex contractual 
rules. 
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Transfer of management involves mostly complex contractual transfers monitored by performance 
indicators and backed-up by sanctions, creating a client-contractor relationship between the 
management body and the local authority. The transfer of responsibilities can be extensive and its 
nature and expected outcomes are detailed in contractual documents. It can include the right to raise 
funds to finance management, but it also involves service payments from the local authority to the 
contractors. The local authority plays a key role as client, monitoring body and enforcer of contractual 
obligations. It sets the terms of the contract and the general policy framework within which the 
contract operates and ensures the representation of dispersed interests in the borough. 
 
Third type: Restricted contracted-out publicness 
This last type includes spaces in which localised interests, clearly defined, take over some 
aspects/functions of the public space. The council has a strong client position and retains a strategic 
overseeing role of all aspect/functions of the space while delegating some relevant management 
duties through contracts with high degree of monitoring. This type leads to forms of 
openness/accessibility that mirror those in other public spaces and accountability mechanisms, 
linking directly or indirectly those localised interests to management and from them to the local 
authority. 
There is a partial transfer of managerial responsibilities over particular attributes of the public space 
(as the location of particular activities such as a street market or a movement corridor). Other 
attributes of that space remain under local authority management. There might be restrictions on 
openness and accessibility for those aspects of the space managed through contract, but they are 
very specific and do not influence significantly the openness and accessibility of the space as a 
whole. Normal accountability mechanisms (through the local authority) apply to the space, with 
specific clear and formalised mechanisms applying for the transferred attributes, which secure an 
exclusive say from all the relevant stakeholders. 
Transfer of management in this type involves a management contract transferring a specific set of 
management obligations from the local authority to a contractor, with clear outcomes and 
performance indicators embedded in the contract. The contractor has operational autonomy, but this 
happens within a detailed framework of obligations set by the client. As the client, the local authority 
is the main part in the arrangement, setting the terms under which the contractors are monitored and 
ensuring those are in line with its own policies. 
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Table 7: Typologies of contracted-out publicness 
Cases Context Rights and Obligations 
Allocation of Management 
Responsibilities 
Publicness Typology 
Potters Fields 
Iconic and visible 
location 
Wide range of users 
Board of trustees’  
Balance of trustees’ 
interests 
Prescriptive lessor/lessee 
relation 
Full management 
Self-funded 
Self-regulated openness 
Complex and inclusive 
accountability 
First type: Stakeholder-
shaped publicness 
Waterloo 
Millennium Green 
Local park in central 
area 
Local + wider interest 
Balance between Council 
and BOST 
Balance of all main 
stakeholders’ interests 
Prescriptive, mixed 
client/contractor and 
lessor/lessee relation 
Operational management 
Part self-funded 
Self-regulated openness 
Complex and inclusive 
accountability 
First type: Stakeholder-
shaped publicness 
Bernie Spain 
Gardens 
Local park in iconic 
location 
Wide range of users 
CSCB preeminent role 
CSCB members’ interests 
Lessor/lessee relation 
Full management 
Self-funded 
Self-regulated openness 
Clear and exclusive 
accountability 
First type: Stakeholder-
shaped publicness 
Jubilee Gardens 
Iconic and visible 
location 
Wide range of users 
Trust’s preeminent role 
Balance of trustees’ 
interests 
Flexible client/contractor & 
prescriptive lessor/lessee 
relation 
Full management 
Part self-funded 
Self-Regulated openness 
Clear and inclusive 
accountability 
First type: Stakeholder-
shaped publicness 
Myatts Field North 
Housing grounds 
Local interest 
Council´s preeminent role 
Resident’s interests 
Highly prescriptive 
Client/contractor relation 
Operational management 
Publicly funded 
Entirely open, with some 
self-regulation 
Clear and exclusive 
accountability 
Second type: Full 
contracted-out publicness 
Leathermarket Area 
Estates 
Housing grounds 
Local interest 
JMB preeminent role 
Resident’s interests 
Flexible client/contractor 
relation (public spaces) 
Full management 
Part self-funded 
Self-regulated openness 
Clear and exclusive 
accountability 
Second type: Full 
contracted-out publicness 
Lewisham Parks 
Varied contexts 
Varied interests 
Council’s preeminent role 
Council’s interests 
Highly prescriptive 
Client/contractor relation 
Full management 
Part self-funded 
Generally entirely open 
Complex and exclusive 
accountability 
Second type: Full 
contracted-out publicness 
Spine Route  
Local street in central 
area 
Wide range of users 
but local interest 
Council’s preeminent role 
Conflicting interests 
Limited informal relation 
No formal management transfer 
(potentially prescriptive 
client/contractor relation) 
Publicly-funded 
Entirely open  
Clear and exclusive 
accountability (but in 
dispute) 
Third type: Restricted 
contracted-out publicness 
Lower Marsh 
Market 
Local street in central 
area 
Local interest 
Balance between Council 
and WQB 
Businesses’ interests 
Prescriptive client/contractor 
relation 
Operational management 
Part self-funded 
Entirely open 
Clear, complex and 
exclusive accountability 
Third type: Restricted 
contracted-out publicness 
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5. Findings: what the cases suggest 
 
This research examined the impacts on publicness of the transfer of management of public spaces 
away from the local authority, and posited a relationship between publicness and context, the rights 
recognised in the transfer and the nature of the transferred management functions. It posed four 
research questions and tried to find answers to them through the examination of nine case studies. 
This section tries to answer those questions with reference to the findings presented previously, and 
derive general conclusions about the implications of contracted-out publicness. 
 
Q1. How are the key attributes of publicness (i.e. openness, access and accountability) dealt with in 
public realm management contracts and how are roles and responsibilities allocated? 
The cases show that the terms of management transfer contracts or terms of leases set the 
guidelines within which managers/contractors/lessees can determine rules of behaviour, rights of 
access and use, opening regimes, etc. The cases in the first type (stakeholder-shaped publicness) 
had typically more latitude to set their own rules of access and codes of behaviour and adapt them 
over time, because of the ownership rights transferred to the management bodies through long 
leases. In both the second and third types (full and restricted contracted-out publicness) contract 
specifications set those rules and codes in advance and monitor compliance. However, in most of 
our cases the general rules of openness and accessibility tend to mirror council-by laws and 
regulations in place in other public spaces. Only  in a few  cases  in the first type a number of 
additional restrictions were imposed by specific lease terms (e.g. restrictions to cycling, dog access 
and rough sleeping, limited adult access to children’s play area and restrictions to political and 
religious gatherings) and where these apply they seem to have the consensus of the main 
constituency for each place. 
Accountability mechanisms are also set out in the terms of the contract or lease, between the 
contractor/lessee and the public body acting as client/lessor. The nature of many of the management 
bodies (community enterprises, private trusts, charitable trusts, tenants’ management bodies, BIDs) 
means that lines of accountability between managers and the membership of those organisations – 
the main stakeholders in those public spaces - are also clear. In the cases in which the managers 
are private contractors (Myatts Field North and Lewisham Parks), accountability to local interests 
(residents, etc.) is secured by the local authority through contract steering groups with direct 
resident/business participation. This is the same for all 3 types of arrangements discussed in the 
previous section: they all present very clearly defined accountability systems for those stakeholders 
represented in the arrangements, and they recognise the interests of the local authority as 
representative of borough-wide interests. 
In general, the allocation of responsibilities in each case reflects the reasons that led to the setting 
up of the management arrangements (e.g. conflicts with market management in Lower Marsh, need 
to improve quality at lower costs in Lewisham Parks, desire for a direct say in management by 
residents in the Leathermarket Area estates, poor state of management in Jubilee Gardens and the 
Spine Route, etc.) and the interests of the various stakeholders in those arrangements. 
In almost all the cases, the strategic coordinating role remains with the local authority formally or 
otherwise. This is secured in the terms of contracts and leases or in a local authority presence in the 
board of trusts. In the only case in which the local authority is not part of the management set-up, 
Bernie Spain Gardens, this role was ‘locked in’ through partnership arrangements between 
managers, council and communities. Operational management and maintenance is the element 
invariably transferred to the management body in full, with a few contractual restrictions related to 
procurement (of cleaning, waste management) in only a handful of cases. This is the same across 
all the three types of contracted-out publicness. 
As regards regulation, only in the first type, characterised by long-lease arrangements, management 
bodies have full regulating responsibilities but only rarely they have full enforcement powers and 
many have relied on existing warden services (from the local authority, from a BID). Responsibility 
for investment and funding has also been transferred to a variety of degrees in most of the cases 
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and across the three types. The possibility of accessing a funding source not normally available to 
local government was indeed one of the main reasons for management transfers. Especially in the 
second type of contracted-out publicness, extra funding complements a transfer of funding by local 
authorities to management bodies through complex formulas. Those cases also involved a 
contractual commitment of upfront capital investment by the management bodies (repaid by the local 
authority over a long period as in Myatts Field North, Lewisham Parks and Leathermarket Area 
Estates. For those cases under the first type, the transfer of the responsibility for funding and 
investment to the management body has meant the search for income generating activities in the 
public space (events, space rentals, etch) as in Potters Fields, Bernie Spain Gardens where lease 
terms allow for that, or through the hypothecation of Section 106 contributions from nearby 
developments to management trusts as in Jubilee Gardens and to a lesser extent in Potters Fields.   
 
Q2. How are those attributes dealt in the day-to-day implementation of those contracts?  
In all the cases the main rules about openness and accessibility and systems of accountability are 
specified either in transfer contracts, lease documents or as sets of rules issued by trusts or other 
management bodies. Some of those rules comprise quite detailed codes of behaviour and lists of 
activities that are or are not allowed (e.g. Jubilee Gardens, Potters Fields), whereas others are much 
less so (e.g. Bernie Spain Gardens) or just implicitly replicate council by-laws for public space (e.g. 
Leathermarket Area Estates). However, it does not follow that all those rules are always enforced, 
and in the same way everywhere. Here the picture is less clear. As mentioned earlier, only a few of 
the management bodies have full enforcement powers or capabilities, and most rely on pre-existing 
enforcement systems (council-run warden service, the police, park keepers). A couple of the cases 
rely on BID-run, area wide warden services to deal with the enforcement of more serious restrictions 
such as illegal trading (e.g. Jubilee Gardens). The cases in the first type (stakeholder-shaped 
publicness) are more likely to abide more closely by their own rules because of the legal liabilities 
associated with not doing so. 
However, even in those cases, implementation of openness and accessibility restrictions and of 
codes of behaviour is mostly done through persuasion or through mobilising the community (e.g. 
issues of dog access, littering and rough sleeping). Therefore, there is in practice much more 
tolerance of ‘deviant’ behaviour across all three types. When and how to enforce a particular rule is 
often left to operatives on the ground, who can better assess the implications of enforcing the rules 
(and restrictions) against the implications of not doing so. Even when formally banned by rules of 
behaviour, restrictions to access and use that are bound to be unpopular with the management 
constituency (local residents, local businesses) are in many cases discussed with that constituency 
before action is actually taken. 
Accountability systems and mechanisms seem to work as prescribed in the transfer agreements. In 
principle, all the cases across the three types have clear mechanisms for all relevant stakeholders 
to have a say in decision making related to public space management. However, the power of 
different stakeholders in the decision making process depends on the way their interests are 
organised and the dynamics of their representation in trust boards, steering groups, committees, etc. 
Local residents are represented directly or indirectly in all arrangements, but the effectiveness of this 
representation varies from case to case. It is central to the arrangement in Leathermarket Area 
Estates and done through the various Tenants and Residents Associations in the area, with their 
own accountability mechanisms, and similarly in Bernie Spain Gardens. It is done through voluntary 
individual participation in the PFI Project Liaison Group, in Myatts Field North, or the steering group 
for Lower Marsh market, which might be more or less effective depending on the issue being 
examined. It is restricted to a fixed number of board representatives of specific residents’ 
constituencies in Potters Field and Jubilee Gardens. The same applies for representation of local 
businesses, more effective when part of a more articulated grouping like a BID in Lower Marsh 
market and Waterloo Millennium Green, or SBEG in Jubilee Gardens and the Spine Route. 
Alternatively, it is potentially less effective when reliant upon individuals. 
The local authority is still an integral component of all accountability systems examined in this 
research, representing borough-wide interests and in some cases local residents/businesses that 
might not be part of management arrangement or might not understand them. However, how 
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effectively that role is played can vary and it is not itself a risk-proof guarantee that those interests 
are protected. 
 
Q3. Do these arrangements and their implementation affect those attributes and how do they do it? 
The attributes of openness and accessibility are clearly shaped by the management transfer 
arrangements, since these arrangements set out the parameters defining and detailing those 
attributes in practice. However, the management arrangements stay close to or replicate council by-
laws in most of the cases. This is especially so for the spaces in the second and third types of our 
typology (full and restricted contracted-out publicness). The strong position of the local authority as 
the client of the public space managers’ contractor, and the nature of the contracts, ensure those 
spaces are open and accessible in ways similar to council-managed public space.  
The spaces in the first typology, which have acquired a state of virtual private property because of 
the nature of the long leases, are more likely to divert substantially from usual by-laws and 
regulations. They are also more likely to be more restrictive in their rules of openness and 
accessibility. Although this issue has emerged in some cases, the existing local authority open space 
strategies in which these spaces are locked in, as well as the involvement of a wide range of 
stakeholders, ensures that the spaces within the first typology are still open and accessible to all 
potential user groups. In any case, whenever openness and accessibility are more restricted than in 
a council-run public space, those restrictions have been agreed by a wide range of stakeholders, 
and in that sense they might still represent the local consensus about how a space should be used.  
Accountability attributes (i.e. the ability of the main stakeholders to have a say in decision-making 
related to the public spaces) are also largely shaped by management transfer arrangements. They 
set the relationship between client and contractor (the council and the management body) or the 
lessor and lessee (the council or other public bodies and the management body), in terms of 
outcomes and performance and spheres and levels of decision making. In this sense, these 
arrangements replace informal channels of communication between space users and the 
corresponding council and its public space management department, with more formalised and 
clearer forms of participation for those stakeholders recognised in the transfer agreements. 
Accordingly, the transfer agreements tend to include most of the local interests of those expected to 
want a voice in the management of a particular public space. In many cases, these voices have 
already been active as pressure groups before the transfer. In Leathermarket Area Estates and 
Myatts Field North, the council housing residents’ interest is the paramount one, and this is 
recognised in the agreements (with the Liaison Group overseeing the PFI contract). This is also the 
case with Bernie Spain Gardens and the cooperative housing residents living there. The other cases 
have a more mixed set of recognised interests (local residents, local businesses, local park friends, 
local landlords, local authority, GLA), and they are variously represented in trust boards (Potters 
Field, Jubilee Gardens, Waterloo Millennium Green), or in contractual guarantees (actually in Lower 
Marsh Market, potentially in the Spine Route). Lewisham Parks covers a wide range of situations 
but the involvement of residents, voluntary groups, etc., is secured through their participation in 
working groups such as the Joint Working Group for Blackheath. 
For the first type of contracted-out publicness, the lines of accountability between all recognised key 
stakeholders and the management organisation is embedded in the management structures, which 
in turn is reflected in the composition of the respective trusts. For the second type, the lines of 
accountability are more indirect. They tend to be external to the management bodies and rely on the 
overseeing role of the local authority or steering groups. For the third type, the nature of management 
contracts lead to different accountability mechanisms co-existing side by side. For instance, Lower 
Marsh market presents some direct links between stakeholders and the management organisation 
(e.g. market traders and market management), and some indirect links (e.g. residents and 
shopkeepers). 
However, in all three types the management arrangements replace a vaguer but potentially more 
inclusive relationship between users and space management with a more structured, better defined, 
more responsive, but potentially more restrictive relationship between recognised key stakeholders 
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and management. In other words, the lines of accountability become clearer and direct but with 
potential risk of becoming less inclusive at the same time. 
 
Q4. What are the implications of ‘contracted-out publicness’ for key stakeholders’ objectives and 
aspirations? 
This question seeks to understand whether there are important stakeholders whose aspirations are 
being systematically undermined or left out in management transfer arrangements, or at least 
whether their aspirations are more undermined by the transfer arrangements than they would have 
been by a local authority-run management regime.  
Residents in the immediate vicinity of the cases are well represented in management arrangements: 
directly as members of boards, steering groups or partnerships in most cases, and indirectly through 
the local authority in the rest. As discussed earlier, this representation can vary in quality. In some 
cases this is done through active residents’ associations, with clear and effective accountability 
systems, while in others it is based on voluntary individual involvement, which can be variable and 
not accountable to a wider constituency. It should be noted, however, that resident representation 
often only encompasses those living immediately around the public space, or those living in public 
or private housing estates in the vicinity. Other residents in the area might not have a direct 
representation and might have to rely on the mediation of the local authority.  
Park friends and other community groups are represented in a few of the arrangements where 
relevant, and where they are not, the local authority provides a channel of participation. However, it 
should be noted that the lack of approachability of most local authority’s open space management 
was mentioned in a few cases, even as a justification for alternative arrangements more responsive 
to users. Therefore, there is a risk that those voices might find difficulties in being heard. 
In the more centrally located cases (Potters Field, Jubilee Gardens, Lower Marsh Market and the 
Spine Route), management arrangements have also recognised the interests of surrounding 
businesses and employers in the quality of public spaces. Most of the times, this was because 
locally-based businesses were among the pressure groups that plaid important roles in setting out 
the management arrangement. It is therefore reasonable to say that businesses have found in the 
transfer agreements a better and more direct way of realising their objectives and aspirations, by 
taking over management responsibilities that would have otherwise remained with the local authority. 
The current controversy about the management of the Spine Route is a good example of that. Local 
businesses are a diverse category and the cases suggest that large businesses are more actively 
represented in the management arrangements. Although there is specific representation for small 
business in the trust board of Jubilee Gardens, as well as in the Lower Marsh Market steering group 
for obvious reasons, it is not clear whether there is pressure for more representation by a more 
diverse group of businesses that could have been better met in the transfer agreements. 
Some of the contractual arrangements have explicitly recognised the role of surrounding landowners, 
either as such or as employers or residents, presumably because of the impact the management of 
the space can have on their property. This is particularly so in the case of large landowners, such as 
More London, County Hall or the Shell Centre, who have seats in the board of trustees in Potters 
Field and Jubilee Gardens. It is also the case of CSCB, which manages Bernie Spain Gardens as 
the open space for the cooperative properties they own. In this sense, transfer arrangements 
recognise formally a stake that would otherwise be exercised informally through partnership 
arrangements with the local authority, participation in pressure groups, lobbying, etc. The 
arrangements do, therefore, provide a more direct route through which to put forward and implement 
the objectives and aspirations of the stakeholders. 
Predictably, none of the arrangements addresses the stakes and aspirations of occasional users 
and visitors. Some of these might be employees of the businesses surrounding the public spaces 
and some of their aspirations and objectives might be secured indirectly through the participation of 
those businesses in management arrangements. Other users will have their interests indirectly 
protected through local authority public space strategies and the overall legal framework regulating 
freedom of movement, expression, etc. In this regard the position of those stakeholders is not 
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different from what it was under direct local authority management. The main difference is that the 
transfer arrangements explicitly recognise other interests as more relevant (relevant enough to have 
a direct say in management) and by doing so, formalise a difference in degree or relevance that 
might have existed before but was implicit. This is especially the case with the public spaces within 
housing estates, as the arrangements clearly privilege residents over any other user.  
There are some other particular groups of users whose aspirations have been explicitly excluded in 
some of those transfer arrangements, such as cyclists, rough sleepers, demonstrators, etc., groups 
that have often been used in the literature to equate the contracting out of publicness to a process 
of privatisation of public space. This would suggest a much more restrictive type of publicness implicit 
in the transfer mechanisms.  
However, a more detailed look reveals that the restrictions to access and use imposed on those 
groups are not very different from those already in existence in many local authority-run public 
spaces. There are restrictions on cycling in the four cases under the first type of contracted-out 
publicness, with the justification based on potential conflicts with, and danger to, pedestrians and 
(especially) children in confined and heavily used spaces. Whether or not this is justified in practice, 
it mirrors restrictions that have been in place in many public parks, pedestrianised town centre streets 
and other publicly-managed public space where there is potential for conflict between cyclists and 
pedestrians. Similar although more controversial are the restrictions to rough sleeping. There are 
restrictions to rough sleeping in all the second and third types of contracted-out publicness, all 
operating under council by-laws. These restrictions are the same that apply to other public spaces 
in the area and incorporate long standing restrictions to rough sleeping in parks and public spaces - 
including highways - embedded in local and national legislation (e.g. the Vagrancy Act 1824). The 
evidence from the cases suggest that the difference is that the sense of ownership the management 
arrangements give to particular groups, be they residents or local businesses, is more likely to lead 
to more effective enforcement of those dispositions, even if this is done through soft means rather 
than blunt application of the rules. In the first type cases where lease terms allowed management 
body to set their own rules of access, use and behaviour, these tend to replicate council by-laws or 
are based on those in force in the Royal Parks (as in the Jubilee Gardens) to the same effect.  
Two of the cases in the first type had specific regulations to deal with political or religious events and 
demonstrations. These are Potters Fields and Jubilee Gardens, the two spaces situated in highly 
visible locations and close to seats of power (the GLA and the Houses of Parliament respectively). 
In both cases, bans on political and religious events were inscribed in the terms of the leases for 
multiple reasons: the need to accommodate varied and conflicting interests of residents, businesses 
and landowners; responsibilities and liabilities that come with the lease; costs of insurance; etc. 
However, there has been no major conflict involving the right to demonstrate in those places so far, 
and the restrictions remain largely notional.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In section 4.6 we presented a suggestion of a typology of publicness emanating from the different 
nature of the management transfer arrangements examined. We propose that this typology can help 
explain the overall effect of those arrangements on what publicness might mean for the key 
stakeholders in each case, but also for society as a whole and for how people experience the public 
spaces of the city. 
The evidence from the cases suggests that management transfer agreements privilege the interests 
and aspirations of those with a direct stake in a public space, and who are organised enough to 
make that stake count. Moreover, this has been done in one of three ways:  
(i) through transferring a wide range of management and decision-making rights to an organised 
body of stakeholders as a long-term transfer of ownership rights;  
(ii) through transferring a wider range of those rights through a contract with a stakeholder-based or 
private body, accompanied by detailed targets and monitoring procedures;  
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(iii) through transferring specific obligations and rights linked to particular attributes and functions of 
the public space and  not  others, to a contractor, again accompanied  by targets and monitoring 
procedures.  
The first type represents a transfer of a wide range of responsibilities to trusts and similar bodies, 
and a wider scope for stakeholders’ interests and aspirations to affirm themselves. Through the 
transfer arrangements those stakeholders are in a better position to shape the space they have a 
stake in, especially as they can also raise finance. There is a clear trade off as even with seats on 
trusts, the local authority gives away considerable power over the space. In return, stakeholders 
assume a lot more responsibilities, relieving the local authority of them and securing a much more 
focused and often more effective management. In principle, other more diffuse or less organised 
interests, which are legitimate but have not been directly included in the arrangements, are 
safeguarded by the local authority through its participation in trust boards or through the terms of the 
lease. The effectiveness of this protection will depend on how the lease was conceived, what the 
sanctions are, and what actual role the local authority has on the arrangement. The challenge to 
wider publicness represented by this type of arrangement is how to avoid a natural narrowing of 
management objectives around the core interests of the key stakeholders involved, at the exclusion 
of everything else. This would represent a ‘balkanisation’ of public spaces, with a well-managed 
sequence of spaces but with narrowly defined publicness attributes. Apart from the moderating 
power of the local authority or other representative public bodies, publicness depends also on the 
ethos of the management body. In this sense, a community trust might have a greater compromise 
with social policy and a wider degree of openness than a private trust, which might find more difficult 
to balance the objective of a well-maintained space with that of keeping it open and inviting. So far 
only minor disagreements have been reported between trusts of all kinds and local authorities. There 
is nevertheless potential for conflict as the number of spaces in that situation multiplies and real 
powers of control have to be tested. 
The second type presents less scope for stakeholders’ interests to be realised, although it secures 
them enough influence on all operational matters related to a public space. Ultimately, that scope 
depends on the latitude given to it by the transfer contracts. However, differently from the first type 
of arrangement, there is a strong and constant presence of the local authority as the client setting 
that latitude, monitoring procedures and outcomes, and imposing sanctions for non-compliance. 
Stakeholders’ aspirations might be represented directly as part of the management body or indirectly 
through the local authority as the main client. The trade off in this arrangement is again the transfer 
of management responsibilities and costs to someone who can do it cheaper and more effectively, 
but the cost is the monitoring and enforcing, far more pronounced than in the first case. Some of 
these arrangements are extremely complex because of the amount and detail of outcomes that need 
specifying in contracts, the pricing for each service, and the way money is transferred to contractors 
to pay for units of service. There is a much smaller risk of ‘balkanisation’ of public spaces because 
the power of the council in the arrangement is more pronounced. Moreover, stakeholders have to 
operate within the framework of council by-laws and council policy. However, there is more potential 
for internal conflicts as the working of the arrangement depends on effective communication 
channels between stakeholders (residents), management and the client (the council). Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of the arrangement and of publicness outcomes hinge on the quality of the contract, 
which requires considerable expertise and resources in drafting, monitoring and enforcing. Once 
again, the quality and nature of the management organisation might be influential in shaping the 
relationship between stakeholders and management: presumably easier for community focused 
organisations, with a direct relationship with its constituents, than for private ones. Nevertheless, the 
professionalism of the latter might be more important in determining an effective relationship 
between client and management.  
The third type embodies a much more focused contractual relationship, which involves only those 
interests related to the management of the attributes/functions contracted out, without necessarily 
affecting other stakes in the public space. In the cases that fit this category, the local authority plays 
the role of the client to the managers’ contractor, and is in charge of setting the terms of the contract, 
its expected outcomes, the monitoring system and the enforcement mechanisms. The contractors 
and the interests they represent have only operational autonomy within the functions contracted out. 
In many ways, this arrangement replicates existing discrete contracts for street cleaning, waste 
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removal, building repairs, etc., which are part and parcel of the day-to-day working of the local 
authority. Publicness outcomes in this case depend on how the narrow focus of the arrangements 
relate to the broader range of aspirations and interests that might be relevant to that space. 
 
Figure 11. Jubilee Gardens. The ‘publicness’ of the spaces is not visibly affected by contracted-out 
management. 
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that the contracting out/transfer of public space management 
responsibilities may not represent a radical change in the composition of the stakeholders whose 
interests and aspirations inform the management of a space. The arrangements, however, formalise 
which stakeholders have the right of a say in decisions about access and openness. The 
arrangements also give stakeholders clear and structured access to decision-making, whilst 
potentially leaving others with more diffuse and much vaguer ways of making their interests and 
aspirations heard. On the one hand, the arrangements seem to privilege the interests of organised 
groups of local residents, organised or large local businesses and significant local landowners, with 
slight variations in that composition depending on location and context. This is done through 
transferring to them ownership rights in some cases while in others it is done through contracting out 
responsibilities. On the other hand, more fragmented and diffuse (but equally valid) interests tend to 
be left out of the arrangements and continue to rely on the elected local authority to safeguard their 
interests. The singling-out and formalisation of particular interests in detriment of others depends 
substantially on context: it may be inevitable as regards the grounds of a housing estate, but 
potentially more conflictive in a central and highly visited location. It also depends on the strength of 
the local authority’s presence in the management arrangements and its effectiveness in representing 
those diffuse interests. The cumulative impact of that process on the city is, however, another 
question that requires more extensive research. It will depend on which type of management transfer 
will dominate and the relative position of those public spaces within the public realm as a whole. 
Overall, the research indicates that contracted-out management of public space does not necessarily 
affect publicness negatively. However, it requires judiciously designed accountability mechanisms 
and clear decisions by all key stakeholders, including local authorities, about whose aspirations will 
be privileged and how other aspirations should be protected. In a climate of austerity and spending 
cuts, expertise in those types of decisions will be increasingly important if public spaces are to remain 
‘public’, whilst relying on the resources of those with an interest in their quality to maintain them.  
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In any case, the contracting out of the management of public spaces should be seen as something 
intrinsically different from the so-called ‘privatisation’ of public space. In fact, this on-going process 
has the potential – even if so far unrealised – to bring about a form of genuine common space, more 
representative of the negotiation and accommodation between stakeholders in each specific context, 
which would eventually allow for the emergence of differential spaces in opposition to the abstract 
spaces embodied in the category ‘public space’.  However for that ‘commoning’ to realise its full 
potential it would require new kinds of institutions that allowed for the kind of accountability 
mentioned above, with the identification but also protection of sets of different aspirations.   
This is where the debate should be placed: the creation of these new institutions and the 
threats/opportunities they bring about. The analogy here is with the move from centralism to localism 
in urban governance in the UK. As Wills (2015) points out, the move could be positive as long as 
there are institutions at the local level ready to take up the tasks that are being handed down to them. 
The cases in this research illustrate the forming of these institutions and how the different skills and 
expertise available in each case can determine the type of publicness resulting from management 
contracting-out episodes. 
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